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INITIAL DISCLOSURES AND DISCOVERY 
REFORM IN THE WAKE OF PLAUSIBLE 
PLEADING STANDARDS 
Abstract: This Note advocates for the reform of the federal initial disclo-
sure of documents rule. Plausible pleadings, mandated by Supreme 
Court’s 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, provide sufficient 
foundation to support increased use of initial disclosures as a means to re-
duce the costs of civil discovery. The Massachusetts Superior Court Busi-
ness Litigation Session’s Discovery Pilot Project pioneered a reform initial 
disclosure rule. The Discovery Pilot Project’s initial disclosure rule differs 
from the initial disclosure requirement under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in that it (i) requires actual document production and (ii) is in-
tended as a principal document discovery tool. The federal initial disclo-
sure of documents rule should be amended to include an actual produc-
tion requirement, but the use of initial disclosures as a principal discovery 
tool is still too ambitious to warrant national replication. 
Introduction 
 Discovery, a significant component of the civil adjudicatory proc-
ess, can impose devastating, even prohibitive, costs on both parties and 
nonparties to litigation.1 In 2009, in In re Fannie Mae Securities Litigation, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld a 
contempt citation against the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise 
Oversight (“OFHEO”) for failing to comply with a discovery deadline.2 
The OFHEO was a nonparty to multidistrict litigation against the Fed-
eral National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), a government-spon-
sored mortgage provider that the OFHEO regulated.3 Several former 
Fannie Mae executives subpoenaed the OFHEO to obtain records col-
lected pursuant to its oversight functions and a 2003 investigation of 
Fannie Mae’s financial and accounting practices.4 
 
1 William Schwarzer, Slaying the Monsters of Cost and Delay: Would Disclosure Be More Effec-
tive than Discovery?, 74 Judicature 178, 178 (1991); see In re Fannie Mae Sec. Litig., 552 
F.3d 814, 824 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
2 In re Fannie Mae, 552 F.3d at 824. This case illustrates the potentially exorbitant costs 
of discovery and the associated need for discovery reform. See id. at 817. This Note ex-
plores reform of the federal initial disclosure rule as a means to achieve efficiencies and 
cost savings in the federal discovery scheme. See infra notes 99–309 and accompanying text. 
3 In re Fannie Mae, 552 F.3d at 816. 
4 Id. 
1442 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:1441 
 A dispute ensued over the extent of requisite production of elec-
tronically stored information from the OFHEO’s off-site disaster recov-
ery back-up tapes.5 The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
declined to limit the scope of Fannie Mae’s request for electronic dis-
covery and ordered the production of the nearly 660,000 implicated 
documents, approximately 80% of the office’s emails.6 The OFHEO, 
despite remaining a nonparty to the underlying suit, hired 50 contract 
attorneys in an effort to abide by the court order.7 Notwithstanding the 
OFHEO’s compliance efforts, it missed several discovery deadlines.8  
The district court consequently held the OFHEO in contempt and the 
D.C. Circuit affirmed.9 The OFHEO also took a significant financial 
hit; it spent approximately $6,000,000—over 9% of its annual budget—
responding to discovery requests.10 
 This Note weighs in on the discovery reform debate in light of the 
prohibitive costs and burdens of discovery in the American civil justice 
system.11 It focuses in particular on the federal initial document disclo-
sure rule12 and recommendations for its reform.13 
                                                                                                                      
 
5 Id. at 817. Skeptical of the OFHEO’s limited production following a broad request 
for documents, the defendants discovered that the OFHEO failed to search all of its off-
site, disaster-recovery back-up tapes. Id. The OFHEO argued that it did not understand the 
defendant’s request for document production to include documents stored on its disaster-
recovery back-up tapes. Id. 
6 Id. at 817, 821. 
7 Id. at 822. 
8 Id. at 817–18. One day before an interim deadline for production of several catego-
ries of documents, the OFHEO requested a nearly month-long extension because it was 
unable to meet the next-day deadline. Id. The district court granted the motion for an 
extension. Id. Two days before the extended deadline, the OFHEO again informed the 
court that it would be unable to comply with the new interim deadline because its previous 
promise to meet it was based on insufficient information and also because it had only re-
cently hired the necessary number of contract attorneys. Id. The OFHEO also said that, 
although it expected to be able to provide all non-privileged documents by the final dead-
line, it would further need even more time to produce requisite logs of privileged docu-
ments. Id. After these communications, the defendants moved to hold OFHEO in con-
tempt. Id. 
9 In re Fannie Mae, 552 F.3d at 823–24. The consequence of the contempt finding was, 
in essence, a limited waiver of privilege. Id. at 823. The district court required the OFHEO 
to provide actual documents to defendants’ counsel that were withheld because they were 
privileged and were not included in the privilege log by the final deadline. Id. 
10 Id. at 817; see also Tamar Lewin, Business and the Law: A Plan to Limit Pretrial Work, 
N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1982, at D2 (observing that litigation can entail years of pretrial dis-
covery and enormous costs). 
11 See infra notes 177–309 and accompanying text. 
12 Initial disclosure of documents is one of four categories of requisite initial disclo-
sure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii). The three additional categories are: the name and 
contact information of individuals with discoverable information, a computation of dam-
ages, and any implicated insurance agreements. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i)–(iv); see 
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 Initial disclosures14 are information exchanged on a self-executing 
basis15 at the outset of litigation.16 The Joint Project of the American 
College of Trial Lawyers Task Force on Discovery and the Institute for 
the Advancement of the American Legal System (“Joint Project”) em-
phasized reform of the federal initial disclosure rule in its Final Report, 
in fact calling its initial disclosure reform recommendations “radical” 
and its most “significant.”17 The Massachusetts Superior Court’s Busi-
ness Litigation Session (“BLS”) also recently put the Joint Project’s fed-
eral initial disclosure reform recommendations into practice, adminis-
tering a state-level pilot program from January 2010 to December 
2010.18 
 This Note advocates for reform of the federal initial disclosure re-
quirement.19 It asserts that plausible pleadings, mandated by the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, provide 
sufficient foundation to support increased use of initial disclosures.20 
The Note specifically argues that—per the Final Report’s recommenda-
tion and the Massachusetts reform initial disclosure model—the federal 
initial disclosure rule should be amended to include an actual produc-
tion requirement. 21  The Final Report and the Massachusetts pilot’s 
                                                                                                                      
infra notes 121–126 and accompanying text for further discussion of the additional catego-
ries of required initial disclosure. 
13 See infra notes 142–176 and accompanying text. 
14 Initial disclosures are also known as “automatic” disclosures because they are made 
without a specific request from the opposing party. See, e.g., Eric F. Spade, A Mandatory 
Disclosure and Civil Justice Reform Proposal Based on the Civil Justice Reform Act Experiments, 43 
Clev. St. L. Rev. 147, 152 (1995). 
15 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A). That initial disclosures are “self-executing” means that 
they are made without awaiting a Rule 34 request for document production or any other 
request for information. Id.; Forbes v. 21st Century Ins. Co., 258 F.R.D. 335, 338 (D. Ariz. 
2009). 
16 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(C) (requiring parties to make initial disclosures within four-
teen days of a Rule 26(f) conference); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(D) (permitting parties 
served or joined after a Rule 26(f) conference thirty days to make initial disclosures). 
17 See Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers Task Force on Discovery and the Inst. for the 
Advancement of the Am. Legal Sys., Final Report on the Joint Project 9 (2009) 
[hereinafter Final Report], available at http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section 
=Home&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=4008. 
18 Robert J. Muldoon, Jr. et al., BLS Pilot Project, 2–3 (last visited Aug. 31, 2011), http:// 
www.mass.gov/courts/press/superior-bls-pilot-project.pdf [hereinafter BLS Pilot Project]; 
Press Release, Supreme Judicial Court, Superior Court Implements Discovery Pilot Project, at 
1 (Dec. 1, 2009) (on file with the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court) [hereinafter SJC 
Press Release]. 
19 See infra notes 242–309 and accompanying text. 
20 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562–63, 570 (2007); infra notes 251–274 
and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 275–295 and accompanying text. 
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emphasis on initial disclosures as a principal discovery tool, however, is 
too ambitious to warrant national replication.22 
 Part I chronicles the ever-broadening development of discovery in 
the American civil justice system and the resultant concern that discov-
ery has become so broad as to become overly burdensome and costly.23 
Part I then presents survey data capturing the experiences of litigating 
attorneys in federal court regarding the extent of the discovery prob-
lem.24 
 Part II first focuses on initial disclosures as a discovery tool, de-
scribing the history and development of the current federal initial dis-
closure scheme.25 Part II next describes the reform initial disclosure 
rule proposed in the Joint Project’s Final Report, and put into practice 
in the Massachusetts Superior Court.26 
 Part III reconsiders the role of initial disclosures in the American 
civil justice system in light of the Final Report’s recommendations and 
the Massachusetts’s initial disclosure reform model.27 It presents argu-
ments for and against initial disclosures as effective discovery tools and 
highlights a principal criticism, manifest in practice, that notice plead-
ings fail to provide a sufficient foundation for any significant use of ini-
tial disclosures.28 Part III then relates the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Twombly, which imposed a plausible pleading requirement on litigants 
in federal court.29 
 Part IV argues for increased use of initial disclosure in the federal 
discovery scheme.30 It asserts that the central argument against initial 
disclosures has been undermined by the plausible pleading require-
ment and that plausible pleadings are sufficiently specific to support 
increased use of initial disclosures.31 In particular, Part IV argues for 
actual production of documents substantiating facts plausibly alleged as 
initial disclosures, but not for the use of initial disclosures as a principal 
document discovery tool.32 In so doing, this Note supports the national 
                                                                                                                      
22 See infra notes 296–309 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 34–65 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 66–98 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 99–141 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 142–176 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 177–241 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 177–232 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 233–238 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 242–309 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra notes 251–274 and accompanying text. 
32 See infra notes 275–309 and accompanying text. 
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adoption of one of two principles features of the reform initial disclo-
sure rule advanced in the Final Report and piloted in Massachusetts.33 
I. The Federal Discovery Scheme: History, Concerns, and Costs 
 This Part focuses on the history of civil litigation discovery in the 
United States and efforts to measure its costs.34 Section A tracks the 
development of discovery as it broadened in scope from before the 
1938 adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure through the 
early 1970s.35 Section B highlights several recent studies on the current 
impact of discovery in the American civil justice system.36 These studies 
sought to capture whether and to what extent discovery is prohibitively 
expensive and burdensome.37 Accordingly, the studies are significant 
for their role in informing the discovery reform debate.38 
A. Civil Discovery in America: Its History and Breaking Point 
 In the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, discovery in 
the federal judicial system in the United States was minimal.39 The limi-
                                                                                                                      
 
33 See infra notes 275–309 and accompanying text. 
34 See infra notes 39–98 and accompanying text. 
35 See infra notes 39–65 and accompanying text. 
36 See infra notes 66–98 and accompanying text. 
37 See infra notes 66–98 and accompanying text. 
38 See infra notes 66–98 and accompanying text. 
39 Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 
Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. Rev. 691, 694 (1998) [hereinafter Subrin, Fishing Expedi-
tions Allowed]. 
Early state-level civil procedure codes included discovery rules, albeit in a more lim-
ited form than those employed in the federal system today. John H. Beisner, Discovering a 
Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation Reform, 60 Duke L.J. 547, 554 n.27 (2010); 
Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed, supra, at 696 (discussing the limited discovery under the 
Field Code). New York’s Field Code system—the first code of civil procedure in the United 
States—serves as an example. Beisner, supra, at 554; Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed, 
supra, at 693, 696. Under the Field Code, advanced by David Dudley Field and imple-
mented in New York in 1848, document requests were rare and were only available with 
court permission. Beisner, supra, at 554, 555 n.27; Subrin, supra, at 693. Depositions were 
similarly infrequent and could only be taken from the opposition in open court. Beisner, 
supra, at 555; Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed, supra, at 696. Interrogatories were forbid-
den. Beisner, supra, at 555; Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed, supra, at 696 (quoting 
Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an Earlier 
Procedural Vision, 6 Law & Hist. Rev. 311, 333 (1988)). 
Many state civil procedure codes were patterned on New York’s Field Code. Subrin, 
Fishing Expeditions Allowed, supra, at 696. The Field Code also influenced the adoption of 
the first national code of civil procedure, the 1912 Equity Rules, which have subsequently 
been superseded by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rules”). See 4 Charles Alan 
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tations on a party’s ability to discover the factual position of an oppo-
nent were due to practical considerations, as well as values and religious 
beliefs.40 Travel was historically difficult, making obtaining discoverable 
information impractical.41 Juries were composed of community mem-
bers already familiar with the facts of the case; therefore, additional 
fact-finding was considered unnecessary.42 The American value of self-
sufficiency also counseled against discovery, as it was difficult to recon-
cile the autonomy impulse with the obligation to aid an opponent 
through information disclosure.43 Minimal discovery may further be 
attributed to the view that litigation was not a rational quest for objec-
tive fact, but an effort to determine God’s truth or serve the perceived 
interests of justice.44 
 In the 1911 decision Carpenter v. Winn, the Supreme Court held 
that the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not empower the court to compel 
pre-trial discovery of books and other writings.45 Demonstrating the 
prevailing view of discovery at the time, the Court reasoned that such 
pre-trial document discovery amounted to prying into the affairs of the 
adversary; therefore, it was impermissible.46 
 Although pre-trial discovery remained relatively rare into the 
1930s, suspicion of discovery was waning.47 By 1932, some states permit-
ted the use of interrogatories and the taking of witness’s depositions.48 
In 1938, the Supreme Court adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure (“Rules”), which includes the modern discovery rules.49 The pur-
pose behind the adoption of the Rules was to secure “just, speedy[,] 
                                                                                                                      
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1002 (3d ed. 2010) 
(reporting that the Equity Rules “in some respects resembled code pleading”). 
40 Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed, supra note 39, at 694–95. 
41 Id. at 695. Travel as a practical impediment to discovery was also historically rooted 
in the English judicial tradition. Id. In England, barristers (lawyer-advocates) were typically 
centered in London. Id. It was difficult for them to travel to the distant counties to con-




45 221 U.S. 533, 545 (1911). 
46 Id. at 540 (characterizing warrantless discovery as a “fishing bill”); see also Subrin, 
Fishing Expeditions Allowed, supra note 39, at 697 (explaining the “fishing bill” metaphor as 
signaling an intrusion in an adversary’s affairs). 
47 Beisner, supra note 39, at 555. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 556; Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery—The Rush to Reform, 
27 Ga. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1992). 
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and inexpensive” dispute resolution, for example by encouraging in-
formation exchange in discovery.50 
 Although the Rules broadened the scope of permissible discovery, 
federal courts were still loath to make full use of the discovery rules.51 
It was not until the 1946 amendments to the Rules that liberal discovery 
was truly embraced.52 The Supreme Court’s 1947 decision in Hickman 
v. Taylor—that an attorney’s work-product was privileged and immune 
from discovery—demonstrated the Court’s changed view.53  Notwith-
standing its decision to preclude discovery of privileged material in the 
instant case, the Court proclaimed that the discovery rules were to be 
“accorded a broad and liberal treatment.”54 
 With the Supreme Court’s blessing and the discovery tools in 
place, discovery proceeded along an ever-broadening trajectory.55 In 
1970, the scope of discovery hit an apex when drafters amended the 
Rules to remove vestiges of limits on discovery from previous iterations 
of the Rules.56 The 1970 amendments also brought concerns that dis-
covery had become over broad to the fore.57 The sentiment was that 
                                                                                                                      
 
50 Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 178. To advance “just, speedy, and inexpensive” dispute 
resolution remains the central tenant of the Rules today. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1; Schwarzer, supra 
note 1, at 178 (reporting that discovery was intended to provide each side with full infor-
mation to encourage settlement or, at the very least, prevent “trial by ambush”); see also 
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947) (setting the goal of discovery at obtaining the 
fullest possible knowledge of the central facts and disputed issues before trial). 
51 Beisner, supra note 39, at 558–59. For example, some courts limited discovery to 
admissible evidence. Id. at 558. Others disallowed discovery of information related to the 
adversary’s case and permitted discovery only to support a requesting party’s own case. Id. 
558–59. 
52 See id. at 559. A feature of the 1946 Amendments was to make clear that discovery 
was applicable even to inadmissible evidence, so long as information discovered was likely 
to lead to information that would be admissible. Id. 
53 See 329 U.S. at 509–10. 
54 Id. at 507 (rejecting the argument that discovery should be precluded because it 
amounts to a “fishing expedition”). 
55 Beisner, supra note 39, at 560–61; Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 178 (reporting that dis-
covery worked well for thirty-five years before problems started to arise); see also Richard L. 
Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. Rev. 747, 748 (1998) (finding the “highwa-
ter mark” of discovery in 1970). 
56 See Beisner, supra note 39, at 560–61; Marcus, supra note 55, at 748–49. The 1970 
amendments allowed parties to pursue discovery as frequently as desired and abandoned 
the requirement that parties show “good cause” to justify a document production request. 
Beisner, supra note 39, at 561. 
57 Beisner, supra note 39, at 561 (writing of the backlash against broad discovery in 
1970); Bell, supra note 49, at 9 (reporting that discovery problems were recognized by the 
mid-1970s); Marcus, supra note 55, at 752 (finding that opposition to the liberal thrust of 
discovery grew by 1970); Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 178 (asserting that it was approxi-
mately in the 1970s when the burdens of discovery began skyrocketting). Beisner also at-
tributes the increased total amount of discovery to the increased volume of litigation asso-
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discovery was dominating litigation.58 Litigants had come to use discov-
ery tools like depositions, interrogatories, and requests for document 
production as weapons to overburden and wear down the opponent.59 
Even if not used to inflict intentional abuse, discovery was thought to 
occasion excess.60 Anxious to leave no stone unturned, parties were 
using the discovery tools to over-discover, requesting and producing 
much more than necessary to inform the key issues in dispute.61 As a 
consequence, cases were viewed as turning on a party’s ability to en-
dure discovery and not the merits of the underlying claim.62 
 Breadth in and of itself was less of a concern than the perceived 
costs—both in time and money—of overbroad discovery.63 Such con-
cerns resulted in decades of debate over how to fashion the rules to 
maximize the benefits and minimize the costs of liberal discovery.64 
The advent of electronic discovery ensured the continuing vitality of 
the debate over how to curb discovery abuse and safeguard against the 
unwarranted expense and delay often associated with discovery.65 
                                                                                                                      
 
ciated with civil rights legislation, the enforcement of criminal penalties, and the increase 
in suits between private parties. Beisner, supra note 39, at 560. 
58 Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 178; see also Marcus, supra note 55, at 752 (observing that 
discovery tools would often “eclipse[], or even subvert[]” the underlying claim and its 
merits). 
59 Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 178; see also Beisner, supra note 39, at 557, 563 (reporting 
that discovery abuse had been prevalent since before the 1938 adoption of the Rules). But see 
generally Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse 
and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1393 (1994) (challenging 
social science research that substantiates the perception of widespread discovery abuse). 
60 Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 178. 
61 Id.; see also Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Keynote Address at 
the National Conference on Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of 
Justice: Agenda for 2000 A.D.—Need for Systematic Anticipation (Apr. 7, 1976), in 70 F.R.D. 
79, 95 (1976) (stating that discovery was being “misused and overused”). 
62 Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 178. 
63 See Beisner, supra note 39, at 563 (noting that delay and excessive costs are hallmarks 
of discovery); Burger, supra note 61, at 95–96 (noting the high costs of discovery); Schwar-
zer, supra note 1, at 178 (characterizing discovery as increasingly expensive and time con-
suming). 
64 Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Empirical Research on Civil Discovery, 39 
B.C. L. Rev. 785, 787 (1998) (observing that the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules has 
been concerned with discovery for decades). The 1983, 1993, and 2000 Amendments to 
the Rules have been characterized as efforts to strike the balance between liberal and abu-
sive discovery. Henry S. Noyes, Good Cause Is Bad Medicine for the New E-Discovery Rules, 21 
Harv. J.L. & Tech. 49, 54–60 (2007). 
65 See Beisner, supra note 39, at 563. The use of computers has significantly increased 
the volume of potentially discoverable documents. Id. at 564. Experts report that 99% of 
the world’s information is now generated and stored electronically. Id. (citations omitted). 
On a given day, for example, 36.5 trillion emails are sent worldwide, employees receive (on 
average) 135 emails, and people exchange 12 billion instant messages. Id. (citations omit-
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B. The Costs of Discovery 
 To inform the debate on the optimum structure of the federal dis-
covery rules, researchers have explored whether or to what extent dis-
covery is prohibitively costly and burdensome.66 In 2008 and 2009, the 
Joint Project of the American College of Trial Lawyers Task Force67 on 
Discovery and the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal 
System68 (“Joint Project”) examined the role of discovery in civil litiga-
tion and made recommendations for reform based on its findings.69 
The project was initiated in response to the concern that the increasing 
length and expense of discovery was adversely affecting the American 
civil justice system.70 
 The Joint Project began by conducting a survey of the fellows of 
the American College of Trial Lawyers.71 Regarding the costs of discov-
                                                                                                                      
 
ted). The costs of producing electronically stored information also exceeds that of paper 
documents because, unlike paper records, electronic data must be processed into a special 
database to be reviewed for relvance. Id. at 565. Beisner estimates that electronic discovery 
can amount to billions of pages and cost millions of dollars in a given case. Id. at 563. 
66 See, e.g., Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Fed. Judicial Ctr., National, 
Case-Based Civil Rules Survey: Preliminary Report to the Judicial Conference Ad-
visory Committee on Civil Rules 35–36 (2009), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/dissurv1.pdf; Final Report, 
supra note 17, at 1; Lawyers For Civil Justice, Civil Justice Reform Grp. & U.S. Cham-
ber Inst. for Legal Reform, Litigation Cost Survey of Major Companies 3–5 (2010) 
[hereinafter Major Companies], available at http://www.lexakos.com/lexakos.asp?id=363& 
category=4 (follow “For a copy of the study click here” hyperlink). 
67 The American College of Trial Lawyers is an association of trial lawyers whose mission 
is the improvement of trial practice standards and justice administration. About Us—Overview, 
Am. Coll. of Trial Law., http://www.actl.com/AM/Template. cfm?Section=About_Us (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2011). 
68 The Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System is a national, non-
partisan organization affiliated with the University of Denver that aims to improve the 
American civil justice system. Mission, Inst. for the Advancement of the Am. Legal 
Sys., http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/mission.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2011). 
69 Final Report, supra note 17, at 1. 
70 Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers Task Force on Discovery & the Inst. for the Ad-
vancement of the Am. Legal Sys., Interim Report on the Joint Project 1 (2008) 
[hereinafter Interim Report], available at http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Sec- 
tion=Home&CONTENTID=3650&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm. 
71 Id. at 2. The Joint Project administered the survey over a one month period begin-
ning on April 23, 2008. Id. The survey included questions about various aspects of civil 
litigation procedure. Id. at 3. Survey questions addressed all aspects of civil litigation so as 
not to take discovery out of context and distort responses. Id. 
Of the 3812 fellows who received the survey, 1494, or 42%, responded. Id. at 2. Re-
spondents averaged thirty-eight years of experience practicing law. Id. Of the participants, 
31% exclusively represented defendants, 24% represented exclusively represented plain-
tiffs, and 44% represented both on occasion, though they primarily represented defen-
dants. Id. The survey methodology has been criticized as according too great a weight to 
1450 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:1441 
ery, “85% of respondents thought that litigation in general, and discov-
ery in particular, are too expensive.”72 Over 75% of respondents agreed 
that discovery costs increased disproportionally due to electronic dis-
covery.73 In response to questions about delays associated with discov-
ery, 56% reported that the time required to complete discovery was the 
principal cause of delay in litigation.74 Further, there was overwhelming 
agreement that discovery delay and cost are directly related; according 
to 92% of respondents, “the longer a case goes on, the more it costs.”75 
From these survey results, the Joint Project’s Final Report concluded 
that the discovery process was prohibitively costly and has taken on a 
life disproportionate to the scope of the underlying litigation.76 There-
fore, the authors of the Final Report concluded that the current rules 
governing discovery are in serious need of reform.77 
 Empirical studies have also produced data on the extent of costs 
and delays associated with discovery.78 Two studies in particular were 
considered at a conference held by the Advisory Committee on Civil 
Rules in May 2010 on issues of cost and delay in the federal civil litiga-
tion system.79 The first, a Federal Judicial Center80 survey, asked attor-
neys about their specific experiences in federal cases closed in the 
                                                                                                                      
the defense perspective. J. Douglas Richards & John Vail, A Misguided Mission to Revamp the 
Rules, Trial, Nov. 2009, at 52, 52–54 (noting that three-fourths of the survey respondents 
primarily do defense work). 
72 Interim Report, supra note 70, at 4. 
73 Id. at A-4. 
74 Id. at A-6. 
75 Id. 
76 Final Report, supra note 17, at 2. Critics of the Final Report’s findings alleged that 
authors distorted the survey results to serve their reformist ends. See Richards & Vail, supra 
note 71, at 54. The survey, according to some critics, does not support the contention that 
reform of the federal discovery rules—much less the radical overhaul proposed in the 
Final Report—is necessary. Id.; see also Interim Report, supra note 70, at A-2 (recounting 
that only 23% of survey respondents indicated that the civil justice system is “broken”). 
77 Final Report, supra note 17, at 2. 
78 See generally McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 64 (summarizing additional empirical 
studies on discovery practice). 
79 John G. Koeltl, Progress in the Spirit of Rule 1, 60 Duke L.J. 537, 539–40 (2010). Stand-
ing Committee on the Rules of Practice and Procedure Chairman, Judge Lee Rosenthal, 
and Civil Rules Advisory Committee Chairman, Judge Mark Kravitz, convened and organ-
ized the conference. Id. at 538. The conference was intended to address the issues of costs 
and delay in the federal civil litigation system. Id. It was held at Duke University School of 
Law in May 2010. Id. 
80 The Federal Judicial Center is a public research and education agency of the federal 
judicial system. About the Federal Judicial Center, Fed. Jud. Center, http://www.fjc.gov/ (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2011). 
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fourth quarter of 2008.81 The survey showed that, in cases which em-
ployed one or more discovery tools, the median litigation cost includ-
ing attorney’s fees was $15,000 for plaintiffs and $20,000 for defen-
dants.82 It also revealed that litigation costs are generally proportionate 
to the stakes of the underlying claim.83 Therefore, the authors con-
cluded that the medians do not support the contention that federal 
litigation is too costly.84 The costs of discovery in high-stakes litigation, 
however, were significant.85 Plaintiffs and defendants in the 95th per-
centile of discovery costs spent $280,000 and $300,000 respectively.86 
 The RAND Institute for Civil Justice87 and the Searle Center on 
Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth88 conducted a second study 
which focused on the discovery costs of large companies in litigation 
                                                                                                                      
81 Lee & Willging, supra note 66, at 5. A sample population for this study was created 
using the Federal Judicial Center’s Integrated Data Base which included information on 
all civil cases closed in the final quarter of 2008, with the exception of cases in which dis-
covery problems were unlikely, such as social security claims, student loan collection ac-
tions, and bankruptcy appeals. Id. at 77. Eighty percent, or a total of 5685 attorneys for 
both the plaintiff and defendant in each case, were contacted to take the survey; 2690, or 
approximately 47%, responded. Id. at 77–78. This report has been called particularly au-
thoritative because it elicited information about specific cases, not merely general impres-
sions. Koeltl, supra note 79, at 539. 
82 Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil 
Litigation, 60 Duke L.J. 765, 770 (2010). 
83 Id. at 774; see also Jack Dew, BLS Pilot Aimed at Reining in Discovery: Voluntary Project Be-
gins Jan. 4, 38 Mass. Laws. Wkly. 787, 787 (2010) (explaining that the proportionality prin-
cipal means that a $50,000 case should not incur $500,000 worth of discovery expenses); 
Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 
Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. Rev. 525, 531 (1998) (reporting that most cases have small 
costs or at least costs in proportion to the needs and stakes of the cases). 
84 Lee & Willging, supra note 82, at 770; see also Willging, supra note 83, at 527 (finding 
that, contrary to popular belief that the costs of discovery are excessive and disproportion-
ate to the stakes of the underlying case, empirical research suggests that discovery costs are 
modest and proportional). 
85 Koeltl, supra note 79, at 539 (citing Lee & Willging, supra note 66, at 35–36). Oth-
ers have also suggested that “problematic discovery” is confined to “complex-high-stakes 
litigation.” See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse: The 
Sequel, 39 B.C. L. Rev. 683, 683, 685 (1998). Scholars thus found that discovery does not 
pose cost problems in the majority of litigation. Id. at 683. 
86 Lee & Willging, supra note 66, at 36. 
87 The RAND Institute for Civil Justice is a non-profit division of the RAND Corpora-
tion and conducts research to further the goals of efficiency and equity in the civil justice 
system. About the RAND Institute for Civil Justice, RAND Corp., http://www.rand.org/icj/ 
about.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2011). 
88 The Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth is a non-profit re-
search and education center at Northwestern University School of Law and focuses on the 
impact of law and regulation on economic growth. Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and 
Economic Growth, Northwestern Law, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter 
(last visited Apr. 6, 2011). 
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with litigation costs exceeding $250,000.89 Although only some respon-
dents provided data on a per-case basis, companies that did exhibited 
average discovery costs ranged from $621,880 to $2,993,567 between 
2006 and 2008.90 Companies reporting at the high end of discovery 
costs reported average per-case discovery costs of between $2,354,868 
and $9,759,900.91  Authors of the report believed the cost estimates 
were conservative.92 The authors concluded that companies are annu-
ally spending billions on litigation and that discovery costs assume a 
large portion of the total litigation costs.93 Thus, according to the re-
port, “[r]eform is clearly needed.”94 
 The story of discovery in the United States is one of expanding 
breadth.95 Such growth led to concerns that over-broad discovery com-
promises the central purpose of the Rules and impose significant bur-
dens and costs on litigants in federal court.96 Studies, including recent 
efforts by the Joint Project, the Federal Judicial Center, the RAND Insti-
tute, and the Searle Center, attempted to capture or quantify the extent 
to which discovery impedes federal civil litigation.97 Although there is 
variance among researchers as to the extent of the discovery problem, 
there is agreement that discovery can lead to significant expense and 
delay.98 
II. The Federal Initial Disclosure Scheme and Reform Models 
 Section A of this Part begins by chronicling the development of 
the federal initial disclosure rule from its initial recommendation in 
1991 to its present form.99 The Section then provides a detailed de-
                                                                                                                      
89 Major Companies, supra note 66, at 2. The study was based on a survey which was 
sent to all of the Fortune 200 companies in December 2009. Id. Nearly 20% of target com-
panies, representing fourteen of the nineteen industry sectors, responded. Id. The study 
has been criticized as having a relatively small sample size and low response rate. Lee & 
Willging, supra note 82, at 770 (reporting that the response rate in Major Companies, 
supra note 65 was only 10%). Lee and Willging also note that, although reported costs may 
appear high in absolute terms, high costs do not answer the relative question of whether 
they are too high, or not worth the price. Id. at 770–71. 
90 Major Companies, supra note 66, at 3. 
91 Id. at 3. 
92 Id. at 5. 
93 Id. at 4. 
94 Id. 
95 See supra notes 39–56 and accompanying text. 
96 See supra notes 57–65 and accompanying text. 
97 See supra notes 66–94 and accompanying text. 
98 Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 178 (observing that discovery is prone to abuse which 
leads to added costs and delay); see supra notes 66–94 and accompanying text. 
99 See infra notes 105–119 and accompanying text. 
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scription of the current initial disclosure scheme under the Federal 
Rules.100 At present, description of discoverable documents satisfies the 
federal initial disclosure requirement, and initial disclosures are not 
regarded as principal document discovery vehicles.101 Section B then 
describes the Joint Project’s initial disclosure reform recommenda-
tions.102 Next, it describes a discovery reform effort, piloted in Massa-
chusetts Superior Court, which experimented in practice with the ini-
tial disclosure scheme advanced in the Final Report.103 Both the initial 
disclosure scheme proposed by the Final Report and implemented in 
Massachusetts stand in marked contrast to the current initial disclosure 
scheme under the Federal Rules in two principal respects—the reform 
initial disclosure rules (1) require actual document production and (2) 
are intended as a principal document discovery tool.104 
A. The Federal Initial Disclosure Scheme: History, Development,  
and the Current Rule 
 When the inclusion of a federal initial disclosure rule was first rec-
ommended in 1991, the proposed rule was worded broadly.105 The draft 
language called for the initial disclosure of “information that bears sig-
nificantly on any claim or defense.”106 Opposition to the broad language 
of the proposed rule by members of the drafting committee compelled 
redrafting of the proposed rule in narrower terms. 107  When Rule 
26(a)(1), which mandated initial disclosure, was first adopted in 1993, it 
limited requisite initial disclosures to potential evidence “relevant to 
disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings.”108 The “par-
                                                                                                                      
 
100 See infra notes 120–141 and accompanying text. 
101 See infra notes 127–141 and accompanying text. 
102 See infra notes 142–154 and accompanying text. 
103 See infra notes 155–176 and accompanying text. 
104 See infra notes 142–176 and accompanying text. 
105 8A Wright & Miller, supra note 39, § 2053. 
106 Id. (emphasis added) (noting the broad scope of the bear significantly standard) 
(quoting Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Fed. Rules of Civil 
Procedure & the Fed. Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 88 (1991)). 
107 Id. Concerns regarding a broadly worded initial disclosure rule included that the 
disclosure obligation would be especially burdensome for large organizational litigants, 
that notice pleading would make it difficult to determine what to disclose initially, and that 
a broad rule would subsume work-product and attorney-client privileges. Id. 
108 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A) (1993) (amended 2000, 2006). Like the current rule, 
the 1993 version similarly laid out four categories of information subject to the initial dis-
closure rule: (1) names and contact information of individuals with discoverable informa-
tion, (2) documents that a party may use to support its claims or defenses, (3) damage 
computations, and (4) implicated insurance agreements. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory 
committee’s note (1993) (referring to information about potential witnesses, documen-
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ticularity” concept narrowed the initial disclosure obligation envisioned 
in the draft rule in an effort not to impose on parties’ obligations to dis-
close evidence of uncertain relevance in response to broad or ambigu-
ous pleadings.109 
 The 1993 version of Rule 26(a)(1) also included an “opt-out” pro-
vision, which permitted districts to decline to impose initial disclosure 
obligations entirely, or to choose whether to comply with federal or in-
stead with local initial disclosure rules.110 This provision was included 
to mollify the critics of a national initial disclosure rule, but also to al-
low room for experimentation with different initial disclosure 
schemes.111 
 The lack of national uniformity which resulted from the opt-out 
provision led, in part, to an amendment of Rule 26(a)(1) in 2000.112 
The 2000 amendment restored procedural uniformity by requiring that 
all judicial districts comply with the federal initial disclosure require-
ments.113 The language of Rule 26(a)(1) was also amended in 2000.114 
The “particularity” requirement was replaced with even narrower ter-
minology.115 That revision to Rule 26(a)(1), the pertinent language of 
which survives today, mandates only that a party initially disclose infor-
mation it “may use to support its claims or defenses.”116 Replacing the 
                                                                                                                      
tary evidence, damages, and insurance as the basic information litigants should provide 
their adversaries without awaiting formal discovery requests). 
109 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee’s note (1993) (reassuring that “[b]road, 
vague, and conclusory allegations sometimes tolerated in notice pleading” would not, under 
the alleged with particularity standard, impose an initial disclosure obligation). 
110 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) (2006). See generally Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. 
L. No. 101-650, § 103, 104 Stat. 5089, 5090 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471–482 (1994)) 
(directing judicial districts implement Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plans). 
Under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, many districts experimented with initial disclo-
sure rules. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee’s note (2000). 
111 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee’s note (2000). A 1995 study by the Fed-
eral Judicial Center found that six of the fourteen largest judicial districts implemented 
the federal initial disclosure requirement. Donna Stienstra, Fed. Judicial Ctr., Imple-
mentation of Disclosure in United States District Courts, with Specific Atten-
tion to Courts’ Responses to Selected Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 26 (1995). Another four districts declined automatic imposition of the rule, but 
authorized judges to order compliance in specific instances. Id. Two of the fourteen largest 
districts preferred local initial disclosure rules over the Federal Rules. Id. Two districts 
declined to impose any initial disclosure requirements. Id. 




116 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii); Wright & Miller, supra note 38, § 2053. 
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plead “with particularity” language with the “may use” provision was 
intended to signal that a party need not disclose information that was 
harmful to its case; parties would not use incriminating information, so 
initial disclosures would not oblige a party to turn over information 
that would aid its opponent.117 The result of the 2000 amendment to 
Rule 26 was, thus, a diminished initial disclosure obligation.118 As a con-
sequence, the bulk of document discovery was pushed to later in the 
discovery process.119 
 Thus, the initial disclosure rule that stands today functions as a 
narrow stepping stone into expansive discovery.120 The current Rule 
26, the basic roadmap to discovery, contains the federal initial disclo-
sure requirement.121 Rule 26(a)(1)(A) concerns initial disclosures and 
provides for four categories of information which a party is required to 
produce as initial disclosures.122 The first is “the name and, if known, 
the address and telephone number of each individual likely to have 
discoverable information . . . that the disclosing party may use to sup-
port its claims or defenses.123 The second category is either “a copy—or 
                                                                                                                      
117 Wright & Miller, supra note 105, § 2053. 
118 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee’s note (2000). 
119 See id. (narrowing the scope of initial disclosure). Rule 26(a)(1) was further amended 
in 2006 in response to a proliferation of electronic discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory 
committee’s note (2006). Rule 26 (a)(1)(A)(ii) now includes electronically stored informa-
tion among the list of requisite initial disclosures. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2006). 
120 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) advisory committee’s note (2000) (explaining that the 2000 
amendments narrowed the scope of the initial disclosure obligation). 
121 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. Rule 26 provides for three types of self-executing disclosures: ini-
tial disclosure, expert disclosure, and pretrial disclosure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)–(3). This 
Note focuses only on initial disclosures. 
122 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i)–(iv). 
123 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i). Commentators have noted the challenges of apply-
ing Rule 26 given its lack of guidance as to the extent and precise nature of requisite initial 
disclosures. Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case for 
Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 Fla. L. Rev. 27, 41 (1994) (arguing that, because the 
federal automatic disclosure rules must be applicable to all types of civil cases, they are 
vague as to the practical requirements); see also United States v. Merck-Medco Managed 
Care, L.L.C., 223 F.R.D. 330, 333 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (observing that deciding whether Rule 26 
was violated is difficult because no federal circuit courts have decided how the rule should 
be interpreted). The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, however, in 
its 1997 decision of Fitz, Inc. v. Ralph Wilson Plastics Co., 174 F.R.D. 587, 589 (D.N.J. 1997), 
interpreted the requirement to initially disclose names of individuals with discoverable 
information under Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(i). The court held that the plaintiffs’ failure to dis-
close declarations in support of a motion for class certification violated the initial disclo-
sure requirement. Id. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs had not met their initial dis-
closure obligation because their complaint was sufficiently specific as to the membership 
of the class implicated and because of their early intent to use the declaration in support 
of class certification. Id. 
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a description by category and location—of all documents, electronically 
stored information, and tangible things that the disclosing party has in 
its possession . . . may use to support its claims or defenses.”124 The 
third category is a “computation of each category of damages.”125 The 
fourth and final category is “any insurance agreement” implicated in 
the litigation.126 
 The second category of requisite initial disclosures governing 
document discovery has two defining characteristics.127 The first is that 
actual production is not required in order to satisfy the initial docu-
ment disclosure obligation.128 Under Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(ii), parties sat-
isfy the initial disclosure obligation by providing their adversary with a 
statement describing discoverable documents by category and location; 
actual production of discoverable documents as initial disclosures is not 
mandated.129 Adversaries, therefore, are generally expected to actually 
obtain documents by serving a production request under Rule 34 on 
their adversary or by requesting production of documents through in-
formal means.130 The onus is thus on the party seeking information to 
                                                                                                                      
124 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii). See infra notes 127–141 and accompanying text for 
a description of the application of this Rule. 
125 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iii). In its 2006 decision in Design Strategy, Inc. v. Davis, 
469 F.3d 284, 295–96 (2d Cir. 2006), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit held that a party was precluded from admitting evidence of “lost profits” for failure 
to specifically include damages from lost profits as initial disclosures. The court concluded 
that the rule requiring the “computation of damages” imposed on a party a higher burden 
than the mere initial disclosure of general financial damages calculations. Id. at 293 (re-
quiring the disclosing party to provide a specific formula illustrating its theory of damages 
from lost profits). 
126 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iv). Per Rule 26(e), a party who has made initial disclo-
sures has a continuing duty to timely supplement those disclosures if they are found to be 
incomplete or incorrect, or if ordered by the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1). Failure to 
comply with the initial disclosure requirements under Rule 26 results in the exclusion of 
undisclosed information from evidence unless the failure to disclose was substantially justi-
fied or harmless. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). Sanctions for failure to comply with initial dis-
closure requirements may also be imposed, including the payment of reasonable expenses 
and attorneys fees, prohibiting the party that failed to disclose from supporting or oppos-
ing implicated claims or defenses, striking the pleadings in whole or in part, or dismissing 
an action in whole or in part. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1)(A), (1)(C) (incorporating by refer-
ence Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i)–(vi)). 
127 See infra notes 128–141 and accompanying text. 
128 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii). 
129 Id. 
130 Forbes v. 21st Century Ins. Co., 258 F.R.D. 335, 338 (D. Ariz. 2009); see also Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 34(a) (requests for production). 
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take affirmative steps to procure actual production of discoverable 
documents.131 
 The second noteworthy feature is that document discovery is typi-
cally not completed at the initial disclosure stage.132 To the contrary, 
initial disclosures generally serve as an entrée into an expansive discov-
ery process.133 Accordingly, the default is that although initial disclo-
sures begin discovery, the bulk of information exchange occurs on a 
rolling basis throughout the remainder of the discovery process.134 
 That initial disclosures merely commence—as opposed to serve as 
a principal tool of—document discovery is more a function of culture 
than anything attributable to the plain language of the initial disclosure 
rule.135 This cultural orientation is evident in the 2004 decision of the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 
United States v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C.136 In Merck-Medco, the 
court held that merely listing the names of nearly 4300 individuals with 
discoverable information did not violate the purpose of the initial dis-
closure rule.137 The court based its decision on its understanding of 
Congress’s intent in enacting Rule 26(a)(1).138 It found that the goal of 
                                                                                                                      
 
131 See Solis-Alarcon v. United States, 514 F. Supp. 2d 185, 190 (D.P.R. 2007) (finding 
that a party may not “s[i]t idly by” but must instead “vigorously pursue” documents dis-
closed under Rule 26 if the party seeks actual production). 
132 Final Report, supra note 17, at 9–11. 
133  Id. at 9 (characterizing discovery following initial disclosures as “broad, open-
ended[,] and ever-expanding”). 
134 See id. (reporting that the current practice in federal court is to pursue virtually lim-
itless discovery until a court says to stop); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory commit-
tee’s note (2000) (narrowing the scope of the federal initial disclosure obligation). 
135 Final Report, supra note 17, at 9–11 (characterizing the federal scheme as one of 
“unlimited discovery” following initial disclosures); id. at 25 (quoting Justice Colin Camp-
bell of the Toronto Superior Court of Justice and member of the American College of 
Trial Lawyers Task Force on Discovery, who said that “‘Discovery reform . . . will not be 
complete until there is a cultural change . . . .’”); Carla C. Calcagno, Motion Practice and 
Settlement at the United States Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, 926 Pract. L. Inst. 207, 238 
(2008) (explaining that initial disclosures focus only on “basic information” exchange and 
do not substitute for comprehensive document discovery); Julia Reischel, Need for Discovery 
Reform in Massachusetts Debated in Wake of Report, 37 Mass. Laws. Wkly. 1345, 1371 (2009) 
(quoting a Boston lawyer who said, “We grew up in a culture of almost anything goes in 
terms of discovery . . . .”);  Symposium, Transcript of the “Alumni” Panel on Discovery Reform, 
39 B.C. L. Rev. 809, 835 (1998) (quoting Judge Wayne Brazil who described a past culture 
in which ninety-nine out of one hundred lawyers opposed initial disclosures and, thus, 
were loath to “do it”). 
136 See 223 F.R.D. at 333 (“[S]elf-executing disclosures are merely a starting point for 
the discovery process.”). 
137 Id. at 331, 333–34. 
138 Id. at 333. The Merck-Medco court noted that no circuit court had rendered a deci-
sion concerning the application of Rule 26(a), but that the at least one district court 
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the federal initial disclosure requirement is to provide an efficient start 
to discovery by fostering the early exchange of basic information.139 
After the initial disclosure stage, parties have the remainder of the dis-
covery period to obtain more specific information.140 Thus, in the view 
of the Merck-Medco court, the defendants could gather more focused 
and specific information during discovery; complete document discov-
ery was not expected at the initial disclosure phase.141 
B. The Impetus for and Model of Reform: Theoretical Foundations and 
Implementation in Practice 
 An initial disclosure scheme which requires actual production and 
uses initial disclosure as a primary document discovery tool would dras-
tically transform the approach to initial disclosures in common practice 
in federal court.142 The Joint Project called for that very transforma-
tion.143 
 In response to Joint Project questions on the function and effec-
tiveness of the federal initial disclosure requirement, survey respon-
dents expressed their views on initial disclosures mandated under Rule 
26(a)(1).144 Nearly two-thirds of survey respondents said that the cur-
rent requirements under the Federal Rules “did not reduce discovery 
or save the client money.”145 
                                                                                                                      
 
grounded its interpretation of the rule in legislative intent extrapolated from the Advisory 
Committee Notes to the 1993 Amendments to Rule 26. Id. The Advisory Committee Notes, 
however, simply state that the disclosure requirements should be applied with “common 
sense.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee’s note (1993); Fitz Inc., 174 F.R.D. at 
589 (explaining that a “common sense” application of the initial disclosure rule bears the 
purpose of the rule—the exchange of basic information—in mind). 
139 Merck-Medco, 223 F.R.D. at 333. 
140 Id. (viewing initial disclosures as a “mere starting” point of the discovery process). 
141 Id. at 334. 
142 Final Report, supra note 17, at 7–11 (distinguishing its recommendations from the 
federal initial disclosure requirements because the reform initial disclosure scheme would: 
(1) require actual production and, (2) conceive of initial disclosure as a principal docu-
ment discovery tool). 
143 See id. The Joint Project issued the Final Report on March 11, 2009. Id. at Title Page. 
144 Interim Report, supra note 70, at A-3. 
145 Id. To the contrary, approximately 35% of respondents agreed that Rule 26(a)(1) 
reduced discovery and approximately 29% expressed their view that Rule 26(a)(1) saves 
client’s money. Id. In another study of discovery reform efforts, conducted after the 1993 
adoption of the federal initial disclosure rule, researchers also elicited survey respondents’ 
views on initial disclosure requirements. See Willging, supra note 83, at 542. Forty-one per-
cent of survey respondents favored a uniform national initial disclosure rule, 27% pre-
ferred to not have an initial disclosure obligation at all, and 30% would have preferred no 
change to the initial disclosure scheme at the time, which permitted a choice to follow 
either federal or location initial disclosure rules. Id. at 543; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) 
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 Given the sentiment of the majority of survey respondents that ini-
tial disclosures failed to realize their purpose of reducing later discov-
ery,146 the Final Report made two principal recommendations for re-
structuring the current initial disclosure requirement under the 
Federal Rules. 147  First, the Final Report proposed broadening Rule 
26(a)(1)(A)(ii) beyond the permitted “disclosure” of discoverable 
documents by providing a description of documents by category and 
location.148 The suggested revision would instead mandate the actual 
production of discoverable documents.149  The reason was that early 
and actual production of documents, without a formal request and the 
related delay, would foster more effective document exchange, narrow 
the issues in dispute, and promote settlement.150 
 The Final Report touted its second reform of the federal initial 
disclosure scheme  as a “radical” and its most “significant” proposal.151 
The Final Report proposed only limited discovery after the initial dis-
closure phase.152 Any further document discovery beyond initial and 
                                                                                                                      
 
advisory committee’s note (1993) (explaining that the “opt-out” provision allowed districts 
either to forgo initial disclosure obligations or enforce local initial disclosure rules). Given 
the choice of thirteen changes that might reduce litigation costs, the imposition of a na-
tional initial disclosure rule came in second with 44% of votes (following only increased 
judicial case management with 54% of votes). Id. at 542. 
146 Interim Report, supra note 70, at 4. 
147 Final Report, supra note 17, at 7–11. The Final Report recommended that, shortly 
after the commencement of litigation, each party should produce “all reasonably available, 
nonprivileged, non-work product documents and things that may be used to support that 
party’s claims, counterclaims[,] or defenses.” Id. at 7. 
148 Id. at 7–8. 
149 Id. (maintaining, in addition, a supplemental disclosure requirement as mandated 
under the Federal Rules); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1)(A)–(B) (requiring parties that 
have made initial disclosures or responded to interrogatories, requests for production, or 
requests for admission, to supplement or correct its disclosure if a previous disclosure was 
incomplete or incorrect in material part and additional or corrective information had not 
otherwise been made available during discovery, or a court ordered supplemental disclo-
sure). Author Eric Spade also proposed an initial disclosure scheme which emphasized 
actual production. Spade, supra note 14, at 187–88. He recommended actual production 
of documents in “discovery-simple” cases (those with limited amounts of discoverable in-
formation) and description of documents by category and location in “discovery-intensive” 
cases (those of heightened complexity). Id. 
150 Final Report, supra note 17, at 8. By way of enforcement, the Final Report rec-
ommends that a single judge oversee a case from beginning to end in order to be in the 
best position to make any requisite rulings, including on discovery matters. Id. at 2, 18. 
151 See id. at 9. 
152 Id. at 10. Even if this proposal was “radical,” as the Final Report claims, it was not 
novel. See William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 
50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 703, 721–22 (1989) (imagining an initial disclosure scheme which ob-
viates the need for subsequent, substantial discovery). Senior U.S. District Judge William 
Schwarzer proposed a similar reform that placed heightened emphasis on initial disclo-
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supplemental disclosure would require either an agreement between 
parties or a court order.153 A court order permitting further document 
discovery would only be granted upon a showing of good cause and 
that the costs of discovery were proportionate to the magnitude of the 
underlying claim.154 
C. Discovery Pilot Project 
 In addition to recommending an alternative-use model for initial 
disclosures in theory, the Final Report also informed the development 
of a discovery reform effort put into practice by the Massachusetts Supe-
rior Court.155 Administered by the Business Litigation Session (“BLS”), 
the Massachusetts Discovery Pilot Project (“Discovery Pilot”) ran from 
                                                                                                                      
sures as a principal document discovery tool. Id. Judge Schwarzer envisioned a system in 
which each party filing an action would serve not only a summons and a complaint on the 
adverse party, but also a copy of all reasonably available documents which support any 
claim or defense. Id. The adverse party would similarly include all documents supporting 
its defense and potential counter-claims with a responsive pleading. Id. Most significantly, 
any further document discovery beyond self-executing initial disclosures would require 
permission from the court. Id. 
153 See Final Report, supra note 17, at 9. 
154 Id. The guiding principal of the Final Report was one of limited discovery, tied 
proportionally to the magnitude of the claims being litigated. Id. at 7. The “proportionality 
principal” was grounded in the notion that the cost of discovery should not far exceed the 
amount in controversy. Id. 
Beyond making recommendations concerning reform of the federal initial disclosure 
requirement, the Final Report included proposed amendments to many current discovery 
rules. Final Report, supra note 17, at 4–24; see supra notes 142–154 and accompanying text. 
It recommended limiting requests for admission and interrogatories. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33 (in-
terrogatories); Fed. R. Civ. P. 36 (requests for admission); Final Report, supra note 17, at 
17. The Final Report suggested that prospective trial witnesses be disclosed early in the pre-
trial phase. Final Report, supra note 17, at 9. It also recommended limiting the scope of 
discovery to facts that foster the “‘just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action 
and proceeding.’” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (stating the scope and purpose of the Federal Rules); 
Final Report, supra note 17, at 11–12. The Final Report further recommended imposing 
limits on electronic discovery. Final Report, supra note 17, at 14. All reforms of the current 
discovery rules were based on the proportionality principal, meaning that the scope of dis-
covery should not exceed the magnitude of the underlying claim. Id. at 7. 
The Final Report also made recommendations for reform of the civil justice system 
beyond restructuring the discovery tools. Id. at 4–7, 17–24. The Final Report advocated for 
fact-based, as opposed to notice, pleadings. Id. at 5. It recommended increased judicial 
management, characterized by increased oversight by a single judicial officer who remains 
with a suit from beginning to end. Id. at 18. It proposed a limit of only one expert witness 
per party, absent extenuating circumstances. Id. at 17. The Final Report further encour-
aged the increased use of pre-trial dispositive motions to identify and/or resolve issues. Id. 
at 18. 
155 SJC Press Release, supra note 18, at 1. 
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January to December 2010.156 Participation in the Discovery Pilot was 
available on a voluntary basis for any BLS matter that had not had a case 
management conference or had not commenced prior to the Discovery 
Pilot start date.157 The purpose of the Discovery Pilot was to reduce the 
burden and cost of civil pretrial discovery.158 
 In accordance with the Final Report’s recommendations, the guid-
ing principal of the Discovery Pilot was limited discovery tied propor-
tionally to the magnitude of the litigation.159 The proportionality as-
sessment took into account “such factors as the needs of the case, the 
amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, and the complexity and 
importance of the issues at stake.” 160  To realize this objective, BLS 
judges and litigants who agreed to participate in the Discovery Pilot 
worked together, typically in the setting of a case management confer-
ence, to define the scope of requisite discovery.161 Pilot participants 
identified potentially dispositive issues at the outset so discovery could 
center on the principal matters in dispute.162 Litigant-participants also 
limited the length of the discovery period as well as the number of 
people from whom discovery would be sought.163 
 Initial disclosures under the Massachusetts Discovery Pilot shared 
the same two key features as the reform initial disclosure rule advanced 
by the Joint Project’s Final Report.164 The use of initial disclosures un-
der the Discovery Pilot thus represented a significant departure, not 
only from federal,165 but also from Massachusetts practice.166 Under the 
                                                                                                                      
156 BLS Pilot Project, supra note 18, at 1. 
157 Id. at Introduction. 
158 Id. The Discovery Pilot was the result of a joint effort of the BLS Advisory Commit-
tee and BLS judges Margaret Hinkle, Stephen Neel, and Judith Fabricant. Id.; SJC Press 
Release, supra note 18, at 1. 
159 BLS Pilot Project, supra note 18, at 1; see SJC Press Release, supra note 18, at 1. 
160 SJC Press Release, supra note 18, at 1. 
161 BLS Pilot Project, supra note 18, at 1. 
162 Id. at 2. 
163 Id. at 1. 
164 See id. at 2, 3 (requiring actual production and near-complete disclosure of discover-
able documents as initial disclosures); Final Report, supra note 18, at 7–11 (same). 
Other states have also experimented with alternative uses of initial disclosures. See, e.g., 
Andrew D. Hurwitz, Possible Responses to the ACTL/IAALS Report: The Arizona Experience, 43 
Ariz. St. L.J. 461, 463–464 (2011). Arizona, for example, has a broader initial disclosure 
requirement than that mandated under the Federal Rules. Id. The Arizona initial disclo-
sure rule requires disclosure, not only of the facts of the case, but also information on the 
legal theory on which the claim is based. Id. 
165 See BLS Pilot Project, supra note 18, at 2–3; Final Report, supra note 17, at 7–11. 
166 Dew, supra note 83, at 787 (quoting BLS Judge Margaret Hinkle, calling the Discov-
ery Pilot a “‘very radical departure’” from Massachusetts practice). 
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Discovery Pilot, initial disclosures required actual production of discov-
erable documents167 whereas, in federal court, litigants chose either to 
actually produce or to describe documents by category and location.168 
 The Discovery Pilot model further front-loaded discovery by man-
dating that the bulk of documents be exchanged as initial disclo-
sures.169 By using initial disclosures as a principal document exchange 
tool, the Discovery Pilot emphasized early and near-total automatic dis-
closure of discoverable information.170 This differed from the federal 
discovery scheme which merely opens with initial disclosures but then 
allows for subsequent discovery.171 
 That the Discovery Pilot was administered by the BLS was also 
noteworthy.172 The BLS is responsible for adjudicating commercial dis-
putes.173 This is significant because there is data to suggest that initial 
disclosures may be less effective in high stakes and complex cases, such 
                                                                                                                      
167 Discovery Pilot participants produced all documents that would be used to support 
that party’s claims, counter claims, or defenses at the beginning of the discovery phase 
without awaiting a document request from the opposing party. BLS Pilot Project, supra 
note 18, at 2–3 (incorporating the initial disclosure mechanism under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
26(a)(1)(A), which similarly mandates initial disclosure without awaiting a discovery re-
quest). Only privileged materials, work product, or documents not reasonably available 
were exempt from the actual production requirement. Id. at 2. Moreover, initial disclo-
sures were complemented by an ongoing, self-executing duty to supplement information 
provided at the outset of litigation as new and relevant information became available. Id. 
168  Compare BLS Pilot Project, supra note 18, at 2 (requiring actual production of 
documents as initial disclosures), with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii) (allowing a party to 
describe discoverable documents by category and location). 
169 BLS Pilot Project, supra note 18, at 3 (citing Final Report, supra note 17, at 9) 
(recommending that only limited discovery be permitted after the initial disclosure). 
170 See id. at 3. As the authors of the Final Report similarly recommended, if a party 
wanted to expand the scope of discoverable information, it would have to obtain an 
agreement from the opposing party. Id.; see also Final Report, supra note 17, at 9. Alterna-
tively, the party desiring additional discovery could seek a court order. BLS Pilot Project, 
supra note 18, at 3. A court order, however, would only be granted upon a showing of good 
cause and proportionality. Id. 
Commentators have observed that the Discovery Pilot approach has potential benefits as 
well as drawbacks. Robert M. Elmer, Commentary: BLS Discovery Pilot Has Potential Benefits, 
Drawbacks, allBusiness (Mar. 15, 2010), http://www.allbusiness.com/legal/trial-procedure-
pretrial-discovery/14155716-1.html. The benefits included increased focus on dispositive 
issues from the outset of litigation, less business interruption, and ensuring proportionality of 
discovery to the stakes of the claim. Id. Drawbacks, however, were that courts have no clear 
guidance as to how to apply the proportionality test and that parties give up control over 
their own discovery. Id. 
171 See Final Report, supra note 17, at 9–11. 
172 See BLS Pilot Project, supra note 18, at Introduction. 
173 Massachusetts Superior Court Administrative Directive No. 09-1 (2009) [hereinafter 
Administrative Directive] (listing the cases that may be accepted into the BLS). 
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as complex commercial matters.174 Therefore, the BLS of the Massa-
chusetts Superior Court not only put into practice an initial document 
disclosure scheme that stands in marked contrast to the federal rule,175 
but it also did so in a setting in which effective use of initial disclosures 
may be least expected.176 
III. The Potential Usefulness of Initial Disclosures: Benefits, 
Drawbacks, and the Link to Specificity in Pleadings 
 In light of the Final Report’s recommendations and Massachusetts’s 
discovery reform model, this Part reconsiders the role of initial disclo-
sures in the American civil justice system.177 Section A summarizes the 
principal arguments for the use of initial disclosures, including that 
they: (1) ensure early and meaningful information exchange in an ad-
versarial system, (2) increase litigation efficiency, and (3) serve the in-
formation-sharing purpose of discovery. 178  It further presents argu-
ments against initial disclosures including that they: (1) neither foster 
time nor cost savings, (2) do not fit comfortably in an adversarial system, 
and (3) pose ethical challenges.179 Section A also highlights a concern 
that pervades the criticism of initial disclosure use: that notice pleadings 
fail to provide sufficient foundation to support initial disclosure of dis-
coverable documents.180 
 Section B then demonstrates that initial disclosures typically have, 
in fact, been used to a greater extent in jurisdictions with fact-based 
pleadings, as in many civil law countries. 181  It then compares the 
greater role initial disclosures typically play in fact-based pleading juris-
                                                                                                                      
174 Willging, supra note 83, at 564 (finding that problems with initial disclosures arose 
more frequently in cases that are high-stakes, expensive, complex, and “contentious”); see 
also Judicial Conference Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules & the Comm. on the Rules 
of Practice & Procedure, Report to the Chief Justice of the United States on 
the 2010 Conference on Civil Litigation 7 (Feb. 26, 2010) [hereinafter Report to 
the Chief Justice], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/ 
rules/ 010 %20report.pdf. 
175 Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii) (permitting a description of discoverable 
documents by category and location), with BLS Pilot Project, supra note 18, at 2–3 (requir-
ing actual production of documents as initial disclosures). 
176 Willging, supra note 83, at 564–65; see also Administrative Directive, supra note 173; 
Report to the Chief Justice, supra note 174, at 9. 
177 See infra notes 184–241 and accompanying text. 
178 See infra notes 184–200 and accompanying text. 
179 See infra notes 201–219 and accompanying text. 
180 See infra notes 216–219 and accompanying text. 
181 See infra notes 220–225 and accompanying text. Fact pleadings state only the facts 
which give rise to a claim or defense and not the legal conclusions which a pleader seeks to 
prove follow from the facts. Black’s Law Dictionary 1271 (9th ed. 2004). 
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dictions with the limited use of initial disclosures in the American no-
tice pleading tradition.182 Section B then introduces the 2007 decision 
in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, in which the Supreme Court announced 
a new plausibility pleading standard.183 
A. Supporters and Detractors: Opposing Views on Initial Disclosure 
 Proponents of initial disclosure as a valuable discovery tool point 
to several principal ways in which initial disclosure requirements en-
hance discovery.184 One theory is that initial disclosure rules foster ex-
change of discoverable information early in the pre-trial stages of litiga-
tion.185 Advocates argue that absent an initial disclosure requirement, 
the adversarial system disincentivizes disclosing information to the op-
posing party.186 The argument is that litigators are so intent on beating 
                                                                                                                      
 
182 See infra notes 226–232 and accompanying text. Notice pleadings, in contrast, provide 
the opposing party with fair notice of the plaintiff’s legal claim and its grounds, not a com-
plete factual account of situation leading to the litigation. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 
(1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp., v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562–63 (2007); Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1271 (9th ed. 2004). 
183 See infra notes 233–238 and accompanying text. The descriptor “plausibility” quali-
fies notice pleadings. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. It indicates that complaints principally 
intended to notify an adversary of a pending claim must include enough facts to state a 
plausible claim. Id. The plausibility requirement does not signal a wholesale change from 
notice to fact-based pleadings. Id. (maintaining that heightened fact pleading is not re-
quired). But see id. 588 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the plausibility requirement 
does heighten the pleading standard). 
184 See, e.g., Final Report, supra note 17, at 8; see also Schwarzer, supra note 152, at 716; 
see infra notes 185–200 and accompanying text. Wright and Miller put forth an interesting 
analogy between disclosure requirements in criminal law and in the civil discovery system. 
Wright & Miller, supra note 39, § 2053. The authors highlight the United States Su-
preme Court’s 1936 decision in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), in which the 
Court held that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the criminal de-
fendant violates due process. Wright & Miller, supra note 39, § 2053. Wright and Miller 
assert that the decision espouses the general principal that litigants can and should be 
expected to disclose basic information to the opposing party. Id.; see also Brady, 373 U.S. at 
87. 
185 Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for 
Change, 31 Vand. L. Rev. 1295, 1314, 1349 (1978). This article influenced the amendment 
of the federal discovery rules to include an initial disclosure requirement. Fed. R. Civ. P. 
26(a) advisory committee’s note (1993). 
186 Brazil, supra note 185, at 1349 (arguing that the adversarial structure impairs dis-
covery’s disclosure objective); see also Schwarzer, supra note 152, at 714 (observing the in-
consistency of aiding an opponent in an adversarial system). That the adversarial system—
absent a mandatory initial disclosure rule—frustrates disclosure objectives is compounded 
by an incentive structure which punishes information disclosure. Brazil, supra note 185, at 
1312. A lawyer who discloses information harmful to a client (absent an initial disclosure 
obligation) risks the economic consequences of losing the case. Id. The lawyer also risks 
gaining the reputation of being a less-than-zealous advocate. Id. In a worst case scenario, 
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their adversary that they cannot be trusted to disclose discoverable in-
formation on their own accord.187 It is instead more likely to find law-
yers playing hide-the-ball than willing to disclose information in the 
name of cooperation or truth-seeking. 188  And, because increasing 
numbers of civil actions settle before trial, discovery often becomes the 
only battlefield on which to win a fight.189 Therefore, initial disclosure 
rules serve as tools to compel information sharing, particularly in the 
early stages of litigation.190 
 The meaningful exchange of initial disclosures also advances liti-
gation efficiency objectives.191 Informed by initial disclosures, parties 
have the tools necessary to evaluate the relative strengths of their posi-
tions closer to the outset of litigation.192 Thus, the initial disclosure of 
relevant information encourages settlement.193 
 Initial disclosure rules also foster administrative efficiency.194 A key 
characteristic that distinguishes initial from other types of requisite dis-
closures is that they are self-executing, meaning that parties disclose 
information to their adversaries without awaiting a discovery request.195 
As a result, the use of initial disclosures as a discovery tool eliminates 
the extra step of a Rule 34 document request, or any other informal 
request for information.196 This saves both the cost of additional pa-
                                                                                                                      
the lawyer who voluntarily discloses relevant information that damages a client’s case runs 
the risk of being sued for legal malpractice. Id. (“[F]ull disclosure becomes a luxury few 
lawyers can afford to pursue.”). Therefore, initial disclosure rules are necessary to safe-
guard lawyers from the potential ramifications of disclosing information in the absence of 
an obligation to do so. Id. at 1349. 
187Id. at 1304. 
188 Id. at 1317. 
189 Id. at 1304. 
190 Id. at 1304, 1349. But see Paul R. Sugarman & Marc G. Perlin, Proposed Changes to Dis-
covery Rules in Aid of “Tort Reform”: Has the Case Been Made?, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1465, 1476–77 
(1993) (recounting an argument that it is “naïve” to think that lawyers will comply with 
automatic disclosure requirements). 
191 See Final Report, supra note 17, at 8. An empirical study showed that initial disclo-
sures achieved their desired outcomes. See Willging, supra note 83, at 534–35. Such out-
comes included decreased litigation expense, shortened discovery, and increased pros-
pects for settlement and fair outcomes. Id. 
192 Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 178. 
193 Final Report, supra note 17, at 8. 
194 See Solis-Alarcon v. United States, 514 F. Supp. 2d 185, 190 (D.P.R. 2007) (explain-
ing the requisite steps to procure actual production following initial disclosure); Final 
Report, supra note 17, at 7–11. 
195 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A); see Solis-Alarcon, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 190. 
196 See Solis-Alarcon, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 190; see also Forbes v. 21st Century Ins. Co., 258 
F.R.D. 335, 338 (D. Ariz. 2009) (reporting that it is more typical for parties to actually ob-
tain documents under Rule 34 or through informal requests than as initial disclosures). 
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perwork as well as the delay associated with awaiting a response to a 
discovery request.197 
 Proponents also assert that initial disclosure requirements serve 
the information-sharing purpose of the federal discovery rules.198 Crit-
ics caution that the discovery system has become dominated by the 
process at the expense of the disclosure objective.199 The argument, 
thus, is that broad initial disclosure requirements are important be-
cause they rightly serve the essential purpose of discovery: information 
disclosure.200 
 In contrast, critics argue that initial disclosures will not foster effi-
cient discovery. 201  Justice Scalia, dissenting from the recommended 
adoption of the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules, argued that 
imposing initial disclosure obligations would have counter-productive 
consequences.202 Disputes could erupt over whether the initial disclo-
sure duty was satisfied, leading to increased motions practice as parties 
allege failed compliance and pursue sanctions.203  Judges might also 
have to assume greater burdens, tasked with regulating and enforcing 
initial disclosure obligations.204 
 Initial disclosure requirements could also foster over discovery.205 
In an effort to avoid challenges or sanctions for failure to disclose, par-
                                                                                                                      
197 See Solis-Alarcon, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 190; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(A) (allowing 
a party thirty days after being served to respond to a request for production); Wright & 
Miller, supra note 39, § 2053 (reporting that initial disclosure requirements were in-
cluded in the federal discovery rules to “channel[] discovery and avoid wasteful activity”). 
198 Schwarzer, supra note 152, at 721; see also Baldridge v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345, 360 
(1982) (stating that discovery provisions are designed to encourage open exchange of 
information); Brazil, supra note 185, at 1332 (stating that the primary purpose of discovery 
is pretrial disclosure of all non-privileged, relevant information and encouragement of 
settlement). 
199 Schwarzer, supra note 152, at 721 (arguing that there is no “intrinsic value” in the 
discovery process itself); see also Irving R. Kaufman, Judicial Control over Discovery, 28 F.R.D. 
111, 119 (1960) (“The clear policy of the [Federal] [R]ules is toward full disclosure.”). 
Even if the focus of discovery is successfully redirected from the discovery process itself to 
the disclosure objective, there remains a question as to the extent of valuable information 
disclosure. Compare Sugarman & Perl, supra note 190, at 1497–1500 (observing that discov-
ery that leads to full disclosure of information facilitates fact finding and truth-seeking and 
fosters just outcomes), with Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 178 (pointing to undue discovery 
used as a “weapon to burden, discourage[,] or exhaust the opponent”). 
200 Schwarzer, supra note 152, at 721. 
201 See, e.g., Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 510 (1993) 
[hereinafter Amendments to Rules] (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
202 Id. 
203 Bell, supra note 49, at 41–42. 
204 Amendments to Rules, supra note 201, at 510. 
205 Bell, supra note 49, at 43–44. 
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ties might expend resources producing extraneous information that 
turns out to be irrelevant to the litigation.206 Parties may also hide be-
hind an initial disclosure obligation to mask their true objective: either 
to overburden their adversary or to bury dispositive information in 
mounds of paperwork.207 Contrary to the goal of fostering efficiencies, 
the imposition of initial disclosure obligations might add a further layer 
(and its associated costs and delays) to an already complex discovery 
process.208 
 Critics also argue that initial disclosure obligations do not “fit com-
fortably” in an adversarial system.209 They assert that there is something 
anomalous in the notion that a party would simply turn over—without 
awaiting a specific request—information to an adversary.210 This proves 
even more troublesome when some of the information which may be 
subject to initial disclosure obligations may be harmful to the disclosing 
party’s case.211 Providing potentially incriminating information to an 
adversary challenges the ethical maxim that a lawyer should not ad-
vance interests that conflict with a client’s.212 Initial disclosure rules 
thus pit an obligation to comply with the rules of a tribunal against a 
duty to serve as a client’s zealous advocate.213 A further concern is that 
initial disclosure obligations might override attorney-client or work-
product privileges. 214  Confusion about ethical obligations as well as 
concerns for the continuing viability of privileges arise in the face of 
                                                                                                                      
206 Id.; see also Amendments to Rules, supra note 201, at 510; Wright & Miller, supra 
note 39, § 2053 (predicting that the burden on large organizational litigants to produce 
extensive amounts of potentially discoverable information as initial disclosures would be 
significant). 
207 Sugarman & Perl, supra note 190, at 1477. But see Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 183 
(arguing that initial disclosure rules are necessary precisely for their effect of curtailing 
excess discovery). 
208 Amendments to Rules, supra note 201, at 511. 
209 Id. at 511. In contrast, there is an argument that initial disclosure rules compensate 
for the bar to information exchange that is the adversarial process. See Brazil, supra note 
185, at 1304, 1349. Contrary to being at odds with the adversarial civil litigation system, 
initial disclosures correct for an inherent flaw. See id. 
210 See Amendments to Rules, supra note 201, at 511. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. 
213 See id.; see also Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct Preamble (stating that a lawyer’s 
duty as an advocate is to zealously assert a client’s position within the rules of the adversary 
system). 
214 Bell, supra note 49, at 5 (expressing concern that automatic disclosure require-
ments will undermine work-product and attorney-client privileges). But see Fed. R. Civ. P. 
26(a) advisory committee’s note (1993) (clarifying that automatic disclosure requirements 
apply only to documents not protected as work-product or otherwise privileged). 
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ambiguity as to exactly what and how much information need be dis-
closed initially.215 
 A pervasive concern that runs through the criticisms of initial dis-
closures is that parties do not know exactly what they “may use” to sup-
port their claims or defenses.216 Therefore, they have difficulty deter-
mining what or how much information to disclose.217 Uncertainty as to 
what information is subject to an initial disclosure obligation is arguably 
part-and-parcel of a notice pleading system.218 The contention is that 
pleadings which merely give the opposing party fair notice of the na-
ture of the impending legal claim do not provide sufficient facts to 
guide the initial disclosure of relevant information.219 
B. Specificity in Pleadings: A Foundation for Initial Disclosures 
 The view that notice pleadings provide insufficient foundation to 
support significant use of initial disclosures manifested itself in prac-
tice.220 Jurisdictions with the strictest fact-based pleading standards also 
typically have broad initial disclosure requirements. 221  For instance, 
many civil law countries have fact-based pleading standards and also 
place emphasis on initial disclosures as principal discovery tools.222 In 
Germany, for example, complaints must include a statement of the fac-
tual basis of a claim.223 Similarly, Spanish courts require litigants to in-
clude a description of the factual background underlying a claim at the 
pleading stage.224 In a related vein (and likely made possible by specific 
information provided in fact-based pleadings), litigants in German and 
                                                                                                                      
215 See Bell, supra note 49, at 5 (asserting that an automatic disclosure rule would re-
quire counsel to turn over documents harmful to a client’s case). 
216 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A) (requiring initial disclosure of documents that a party 
“may use” to support its claims or defenses); Subrin, supra note 123, at 39–40. 
217 See Subrin, supra note 123, at 39–40. 
218 Id. at 46 (“Notice pleading does not give much guidance for discovery. If one wants 
a core exchange of information . . . more specific pleading is necessary.”). 
219 Id. The drafters of the 1993 version of Rule 26(a)(1) attempted to cure the prob-
lem posed by notice pleadings by mandating initial disclosure only of information “alleged 
with particularity in the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) advisory committee’s note (1993) 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). This language, however, did not 
survive the 2000 amendment of the federal initial disclosure rule. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) 
advisory committee’s note (2000). Thus, notice pleadings provide little guidance as to 
what information a party may use in litigation. Wright & Miller, supra note 39, § 2053. 




224 Id. The American Federal Rules mandate only that a pleading contain “a short and 
plain statement” showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(i). 
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Spanish courts supplement pleadings with initial disclosure of docu-
ments that speak to factual assertions in the pleadings.225 
 In contrast, initial disclosures assume a relatively minor role in 
document discovery in the American judicial system.226 The American 
system’s reduced emphasis on initial disclosure as a principal document 
discovery vehicle is likely related to its liberal, notice-pleading tradi-
tion.227 Until recently, pleading standards in American federal courts 
were governed by the 1957 case of Conley v. Gibson, in which the United 
States Supreme Court held that a complaint alleging general failure of 
a union to adequately protect African-American members from dis-
criminatory discharge was sufficient although it contained “no set of 
facts.”228 Pleadings, according to the Conley Court, were intended only 
to provide the opposing party with fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim 
and its basis, not its factual specifics.229 
 When the federal initial disclosure rule was codified in the Rules 
in 1993 and amended in 2000, Conley and its “no set of facts” pleading 
standard governed.230 Consequently, critics were concerned that such a 
                                                                                                                      
225 Final Report, supra note 17, Appendix A, at 2. 
226 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) advisory committee’s note (2000). See infra notes 105–119 
and accompanying text for a discussion of the history of the federal initial disclosure rule. 
227 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562–63 (abrogating Conley); see Final Report, supra note 17, at 
5, 7–11 (recommending that fact-based pleading replace notice pleading as a predicate to 
recommending increased use of initial disclosures as a vehicle for actual and near-total 
production of discoverable documents); see also Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. 
228 355 U.S. at 45–48. In Conley, a class of African-American railroad workers brought 
suit against their employment union. Id. at 42–43. The petitioners alleged that the union 
did nothing to protect them in face of the demotion or discharge of forty-five African-
American workers. Id. at 43. 
229 Id. at 47. The Conley Court bolstered its decision by pointing to the ensuing discov-
ery period and identifying it as the appropriate time to narrow the disputed issues. Id. at 
47–48. The Court’s reliance on the discovery process as the time to focus the claim by nar-
rowing the disputed facts and issues reflected a difference in the times. Compare id. (dem-
onstrating comfort in allowing litigants to pass into the discovery phase), with Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (passing into discovery requires well-pleaded facts lend-
ing plausibility to the claim), and Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (finding it necessary to avoid 
the expense of unwarranted discovery). The Conley Court could be so carefree in its deci-
sion to push the narrowing of disputed issues off into the discovery phase because, when 
Conley was decided, discovery was not as costly or time-consuming as it is today. See Schwar-
zer, supra note 1, at 178 (noting that concerns about discovery arose in the 1970s). There-
fore, the need to narrow the issues in dispute from the pleading stage in an effort to con-
serve resources in the subsequent discovery period was less of a concern to the Supreme 
Court. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 47–48; Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 178. See also the discussion 
of Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947), supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text. 
230 See Conley, 355 U.S. at 45, 47–48 (holding that, unless it appeared beyond doubt 
that a plaintiff could prove “no set of facts,” a complaint should not be dismissed). But see 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562–63 (noting that the “no set of facts” language of Conley had either 
not always been interpreted literally or was “questioned, criticized, and explained away”). 
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lax pleading standard would fail to provide parties sufficient informa-
tion to support an initial disclosure obligation. 231  That concern, in 
turn, led to today’s narrow initial disclosure requirement.232 
 The Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 
however, fundamentally changed the pleading requirements in Ameri-
can courts.233 In Twombly, the Supreme Court abrogated the “no set of 
facts” pleading standard of Conley and held that pleadings must set forth 
sufficient facts to demonstrate the plausibility of the conduct alleged.234 
The decision centered on a complaint filed by representatives of a class 
of local telephone and internet service providers alleging defendants’ 
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.235 In their complaint, the plain-
tiffs failed to plead to any specific facts, but instead merely mimicked the 
words of the statute.236 The Supreme Court found this minimal plead-
ing insufficient and held that enough facts must be included in a com-
plaint to state a plausible claim.237 Mere allegations of wrongdoing with-
out any specific evidence would not survive a motion to dismiss.238 
                                                                                                                      
 
231 Wright & Miller, supra note 39, § 2053. 
232 Id. 
233 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562–63, 570. Compare id. (maintaining that the Supreme Court 
was not mandating heightened fact pleading of specifics), with A. Benjamin Spencer, Plau-
sibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 431, 431 (2008) (“Notice pleading is dead.”). 
234 550 U.S. at 562–63, 570. 
235 Id. at 549, 553. 
236 Id. at 551, 553–54. The complaint alleged unlawful contract, combination, or con-
spiracy, and further pointed only to general parallel conduct to demonstrate the existence 
of an anti-trust conspiracy. Id. 
237 Id. at 570. 
238 Id. at 562–63, 570. As was the Conley Court before it, the Twombly Court was influ-
enced in its decision regarding the sufficiency of pleadings by the impending discovery. Id. 
at 559; Conley, 355 U.S. 47–48. But, by its 2007 decision in Twombly, the Court’s view of dis-
covery had changed since the days of its 1957 decision in Conley. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 
559; Conley, 355 U.S. 47–48 (submitting that disputed issues are appropriately narrowed 
during discovery). The Court was now concerned with the threat of discovery costs, par-
ticularly in antitrust litigation, which is notorious for expensive and protracted discovery. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558–59 (citing Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 
2d 986, 995 (N.D. Ill. 2003)). Thus, if the door to discovery—with its associated cost and 
delay—was to open, parties must state a plausible justification. Id. at 570. 
The dissent in Twombly held a different view on the ease with which parties should be 
permitted to cross into discovery. See id. at 577 (Stevens, J., dissenting). They felt that fear of 
the burdens of discovery should not justify raising the entry bar. See id. at 583, 593 n.13 (“The 
potential for ‘sprawling, costly, and hugely time-consuming’ discovery is no reason to throw 
the baby out with the bathwater.”) (internal citation omitted). The dissent thought discovery 
could be controlled through case management at the trial level. Id. at 573. Compare id. at 596 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (chiding the majority for demonstrating lack of confidence in trial 
judge’s ability to control discovery), with id. at 560 n.6 (quoting Frank Easterbrook, Discovery 
as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 635, 638–39 (1989)) (expressing the view that judicial officers can-
not know enough about the case to adequately control discovery). 
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 In sum, there are arguments for and against use of initial disclo-
sures in discovery.239 Opponents of initial disclosures have expressed 
concern that notice pleadings fail to provide sufficient foundation to 
support initial disclosures.240 Although American courts have tradition-
ally permitted notice pleadings, the Supreme Court in Twombly, im-
posed heightened pleading standards on litigants in federal court.241 
IV. Reforming the Federal Initial Disclosure Rule in a Post-
Twombly Era and the National Applicability of  
the Massachusetts Discovery Pilot Program 
 This Part argues for reform of the federal initial disclosure rule.242 
It asserts that plausible pleadings provide sufficient basis to support in-
creased use of initial disclosures in the federal discovery system.243 It 
specifically argues for greater actual production of documents as initial 
disclosures, but not the use of initial disclosures as a principal docu-
ment discovery tool.244 
 Section A asserts that Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly challenges the 
fundamental assumption that pleadings in the American judicial system 
                                                                                                                      
Two years after the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Twombly, it expressly ex-
tended the plausibility standard to pleadings in all civil actions. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953. In its 
2009 decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff’s complaint did not 
surpass the plausibility threshold and should be dismissed. See id. at 1954. The plaintiff in 
Iqbal sued multiple federal officials, including Attorney General John Ashcroft and Federal 
Bureau of Investigations Director John Mueller, for violating his rights under the First and 
Fifth Amendments stemming from the alleged existence of a policy of “harsh conditions of 
confinement on account of [] race, religion, or national origin.” Id. at 1942. The Court held 
that the allegations in the complaint were bare and conclusory assertions, unsupported by 
facts lending plausibility to the claim. Id. at 1949–50. In light of the holding in Twombly, the 
complaint failed to meet the requisite pleading standard. Id. at 1953–54. 
In considering whether the complaint would survive a motion to dismiss, the Iqbal 
Court, like the Twombly and Conley Courts, was influenced by the discovery that would en-
sue if litigation was allowed to go forward. Id. at 1953; see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559; Conley, 
355 U.S. at 47–48. The Court decided that a complaint which does not state a plausible 
claim should not “unlock the doors of discovery.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950; see, e.g., Cuomo 
v. Clearing House Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2719 (2009) (recognizing that discovery tactics 
may be abusive and that judges must prevent unwarranted, overbroad discovery). Justice 
Breyer expressed his alternative view that discovery can be sufficiently limited by means 
other than heightened pleading standards. 129 S. Ct. at 1961–62 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(opining that lower courts can structure discovery in ways that avoid undue burdens). 
239 See supra notes 184–219 and accompanying text. 
240 See supra notes 216–219 and accompanying text. 
241 See supra notes 226–238 and accompanying text. 
242 See infra notes 251–309 and accompanying text. 
243 See infra notes 251–274 and accompanying text. 
244 See infra notes 275–309 and accompanying text. 
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provide insufficient foundation to support the use of initial disclo-
sures.245 It then makes the case that plausible pleadings are sufficiently 
specific to support increased use of initial disclosures.246 Section B then 
considers the question of whether plausible pleadings are sufficiently 
specific to support initial disclosures to the extent envisioned in the 
Massachusetts Discovery Pilot.247 It advocates for actual production as 
initial disclosure of documents that support facts necessary for plausabil-
ity..248 The Section further asserts, however, that even plausible plead-
ings may not be sufficiently specific to support the use of initial disclo-
sures as a principal document discovery vehicle.249 Therefore, although 
aspects of Massachusetts’s reform initial disclosure rule should be 
adopted nationally, the Discovery Pilot model on the whole is too ex-
treme to warrant national replication.250 
A. Initial Disclosures and Pleading Standards: Recalibrating the  
Relationship Post-Twombly 
 The time is ripe for reform of the federal initial disclosure rule to 
impose a heightened initial disclosure obligation.251 Now is an oppor-
tune time for reform because the Supreme Court, in Twombly, raised 
the pleading requirements in American courts.252 In announcing the 
plausibility pleading requirement, the Supreme Court’s Twombly deci-
sion affected more than just the requisite pleading standards in the 
American civil justice system.253 It challenged the foundation underly-
ing one of the principal arguments against the federal initial disclosure 
requirement: that notice pleadings provide insufficient foundation to 
                                                                                                                      
245 See infra notes 251–255 and accompanying text. 
246 See infra notes 256–274 and accompanying text. 
247 See infra notes 275–309 and accompanying text. 
248 See infra notes 275–295 and accompanying text. 
249 See infra notes 296–309 and accompanying text. 
250 See infra notes 296–309 and accompanying text. 
251 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562–63, 570 (2007); Subrin, supra note 
123, at 39–40 (arguing that notice pleadings provide insufficient support to base initial 
disclosures). 
252 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562–63, 570. 
253 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee’s note (1993) (noting the link be-
tween specificity in pleadings and usefulness of initial disclosure); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 
562–63, 570. Twombly also reflected the majority’s view on discovery and its interest in fos-
tering efficiencies and avoiding excessive costs. 550 U.S. at 559. 
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support initial disclosure.254 The Supreme Court’s introduction of a 
plausible pleading standard in Twombly undercut this argument.255 
 Newly required plausible pleadings support increased use of initial 
disclosures.256 Initially, this is because plausible pleadings are more spe-
cific than notice pleadings.257 Indeed, the Twombly Court did not man-
date specific but plausible pleadings.258 There is, however, a direct relation-
ship between plausibility and specificity.259 A pleading is only plausible if 
it includes enough factual information to plausibly suggest wrongful 
conduct.260 Therefore, the Twombly Court’s required inclusion of addi-
tional facts necessarily lends specificity, as well as plausibility, to a claim.261 
 The argument that specific (i.e. plausible) pleadings support in-
creased use of initial disclosures next rests on a fundamental assump-
tion about the relationship between the specificity of pleadings and 
usefulness of initial disclosures.262 The assumption is that initial disclo-
sures are a less effective discovery tool when pleadings are less spe-
cific.263 Conversely, initial disclosures may be more useful when plead-
                                                                                                                      
254 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562–63, 570. Critics of initial disclosures argue that parties 
served with notice pleadings cannot know what they may use to support their claims or 
defenses. Subrin, supra note 123, at 39–40. 
255 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see also Daniel E. Troy, Seize the Opportunity—Reduce the 
Costs and Burdens of Our Current Justice System, Metro. Corp. Couns., July 2010, at 1, 20 
(finding plausible pleadings sufficiently focused to eliminate the need for defendants to 
preserve massive amounts of potentially discoverable information). 
256 Cf. Subrin, supra note 123, at 39–40, 46. 
257 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558, 570; Black’s Law Dictionary 1271 (9th ed. 2004) 
(stating that notice pleadings do not require complete factual detail). 
258 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. 
259 See id. at 558, 570 (requiring plaintiffs to allege additional facts to surpass the plau-
sibility threshold). 
260 Id. 
261 See id. at 552, 558, 562–63, 570. 
262 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee’s note (1993). The Advisory Com-
mittee responsible for the 1993 amendments to Rule 26(a)(1) recommended holding a 
Rule 26(f) conference early in the pre-trial phase when the allegations in the complaint 
are stated broadly. Id. When the pleadings provided insufficient foundation, a Rule 26(f) 
meeting would facilitate the meaningfulness and usefulness of initial disclosures. Id. The 
meeting would thereby compensate for the lack of specificity in the pleadings and the 
related lack of grounds on which to base decisions concerning initial disclosure. See id.; see 
also Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 180 (“The disclosure system departs from the philosophy 
underlying notice pleading . . . .”). 
263 See, e.g., Rebecca Love Kourlis, Jordan M. Singer, & Natalie Knowlton, Reinvingorat-
ing Pleadings, 87 Denv. U. L. Rev. 245, 256 (2010) (stating that discovery is ill-equipped to 
efficiently narrow issues in dispute, particularly when the pleadings do not provide a suffi-
ciently focused framework); Subrin, supra note 123, at 47 (observing that notice pleading 
does not give much guidance for discovery). 
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ing standards are more specific.264 More specific pleadings can lead to 
greater reliance on initial disclosures as document discovery tools be-
cause more specific pleadings include more factual detail.265 Thus, par-
ties have a greater opportunity to gain an early understanding of the 
principal issues in dispute and, accordingly, what they may use to ad-
vance their claims or defenses.266 Accordingly, more specific pleadings 
promote the early exchange of core information as initial disclo-
sures.267 
 Evidence of the relationship between specificity in pleading and 
the usefulness of initial disclosures is apparent in the disparate role of 
initial disclosures in jurisdictions with different pleading standards.268 
In fact-based pleading jurisdictions, as in many civil law countries, ini-
tial disclosures play a greater role in discovery.269 In the United States, 
with its notice pleading system characterized until recently by the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Conley, the breadth and potential usefulness 
of initial disclosures has been minimized since even before their inclu-
sion in the federal discovery rules.270 
 Thus, at the extreme ends of the notice to fact-based pleading 
spectrum, initial disclosures assume little and great usefulness respec-
tively.271 This practical evidence indicates that there is a correlation be-
tween the usefulness of initial disclosures and pleadings of greater 
specificity.272 Therefore, together with the movement away from pure 
notice to plausible pleading described in Twombly, so too should the 
                                                                                                                      
264 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee’s note (1993) (“The greater the speci-
ficity and clarity of the allegations in the pleadings, the more complete should be the [ini-
tial disclosure] of potential witnesses and types of documentary evidence.”). 
265 Cf. Subrin, supra note 123, at 46 (finding notice pleadings insufficient to support 
initial disclosures). 
266 See id. 
267 See id.; see also Wright & Miller, supra note 39, § 2053 (observing that “specific 
pleadings . . . promote disclosure”). 
268 See supra notes 220–232 and accompanying text (discussing the greater role of ini-
tial disclosures in fact-pleading jurisdictions). 
269 See supra notes 220–225 and accompanying text. 
270 See supra notes 226–232 and accompanying text. 
271 Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee’s note (2000) (narrowing the 
scope of the federal initial disclosure rule), with Final Report, supra note 17, Appendix A, 
at 2 (describing increased use of initial disclosures in fact-pleading jurisdictions). 
272 Final Report, supra note 17, Appendix A, at 2. That there is a relationship be-
tween the specificity of pleadings and the usefulness of initial disclosures as a principal tool 
of discovery is also implicit in the Final Report. See id. at 5. The Final Report not only rec-
ommends the increased use of initial disclosures, but further advocates for the imposition 
of fact-based as opposed to notice pleading standards. Id. 
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role of initial disclosures in the federal discovery scheme change.273 In 
conjunction with the imposition of a heightened pleading standard 
post-Twombly, the federal discovery scheme should place greater em-
phasis on initial disclosures as a means to achieve cost savings and effi-
ciencies in discovery.274 
B. The Middling Path: An Argument for a Federal Initial Disclosure Obligation 
That Embraces Increased Actual Production but Not the Use of 
 Initial Disclosures as a Principal Document Discovery Tool 
 The federal initial disclosure rule should be amended to require 
increased actual production of documents as initial disclosures. 275  
Specifically, the rule should mandate actual production as initial dis-
closures of documents that substantiate plausibly pled facts.276 
 The plausible pleading standard provides increased opportunity 
for actual production of discoverable information as initial disclosure 
because it requires the pleader to narrow and focus the allegations by 
                                                                                                                      
273 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559, 562–63; Subrin, supra note 123, at 46 (stating that 
“more specific pleading is necessary” to guide discovery). 
274 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee’s note (1993) (“[C]ertain basic in-
formation [] is needed in most cases to prepare for trial or make an informed decision 
about settlement.”); Final Report, supra note 17, at 8. 
275 See BLS Pilot Project, supra note 18, at 2. 
276 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee’s note (1993) (expecting more 
meaningful initial disclosures when the pleadings are more specific and clear); BLS Pilot 
Project, supra, note 18, at 2. Much in this analysis resembles the requirement to initially 
disclose information “alleged with particularity,” as under the 1993 version of the federal 
initial disclosure rule. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee’s note (1993). The 
principal difference between the initial disclosures mandated under the 1993 rule and 
those advanced in this Note is that the 1993 rule mandated initial disclosure of informa-
tion relevant to disputed facts “alleged with particularity in the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
26(a)(1)(A) (1993) (amended 2000, 2006). This Note advocates for actual production of 
discoverable documents that substantiate facts that put a complaint over the plausibility 
threshold. See supra notes 275–295 and accompanying text; see also Final Report, supra 
note 17, at 7–8. 
Tying initial disclosures to facts that are plausibility pled addresses one of the principal 
concerns of critics who opposed the particularity standard under the 1993 federal initial 
disclosure rule. See Subrin, supra note 123, at 39. Critics of the 1993 rule argued that what 
constituted a fact plead with particularity would be unclear in a notice pleading system; thus, 
litigants would have no guidance as to what information to disclose initially. See id. Plausi-
bility requirements provide that guidance: any fact that makes a claim more plausible than 
not should be accompanied by actual production of documents as initial disclosures. But 
cf. id. Therefore, if the complaint is held to be sufficient then it should necessarily be fol-
lowed shortly thereafter with actual documents as initial disclosures. But cf. id. 
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including facts sufficient to lend plausibility to a claim.277 This local-
ization is conducive to the increased use of initial disclosure as a vehi-
cle for actual production of discoverable documents.278 Parties initiat-
ing litigation, by virtue of having written a plausible complaint, have 
necessarily gathered sufficient information at the outset to state a 
plausible claim.279  Because such information would have informed 
the drafting of the complaint, it should be readily available to actually 
produce as initial disclosure.280 In fact, it seems wasteful—as the cur-
rent Federal Rules permit—for a plaintiff to have conducted the req-
uisite research to state a plausible claim and then merely to turn over 
a statement describing the category and location of implicated docu-
ments to the adversary.281 Doing so adds “a further layer” of undue 
burden and expense to the discovery process.282 It requires the oppos-
ing party to submit a request for the production of documents, which 
carries with it both time and cost implications.283 Pigeon-holing an 
adversary into this position should not be permitted; where possible, 
it is more efficient to circumvent the middle man that is a request for 
document production.284 This will result in time and cost savings.285 
 In turn, plausible complaints allow defendants to focus their de-
fensive efforts, gathering the type and amount of information neces-
sary to refute the more precise allegations.286 Plausible pleadings also 
                                                                                                                      
 
277 Cf. Final Report, supra note 17, at 5 (recommending fact-based as opposed to no-
tice pleadings for their potential to highlight the dispositive issues from the outset of litiga-
tion). 
278 Cf. id. 
279 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57; BLS Pilot Project, supra note 18, at 2. 
280 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee’s note (1993) (expecting more 
meaningful initial disclosures when the pleadings are more specific and clear). 
281 But cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A). 
282 See Amendments to Rules, supra note 201, at 510 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
283 Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(A) (allowing thirty days to respond to a request for docu-
ment production); see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558–59 (noting the expense of discovery in 
antitrust litigation). 
284 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee’s note (1993) (indicating that initial 
disclosures can result in time and cost savings); see also Solis-Alarcon v. United States, 514 F. 
Supp. 2d 185, 189 (D.P.R. 2007) (observing that parties typically obtain documents 
through Rule 34 requests for document production or other informal means). 
285 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee’s note (1993). Even if these savings are 
only marginal, they are still time and cost savings. Cf. id. 
286 See Final Report, supra note 17, at 7–9; see also Troy, supra note 255, at 20 (assert-
ing that plausibility pleadings are sufficiently focused such that the need for defendants to 
preserve significant amounts of potentially discoverable information is eliminated). 
Judges should monitor the parties to ensure that they do not use initial disclosures to 
overwhelm and overburden their adversary with paperwork. See Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 
178 (reporting that discovery tools may be used abusively to inundate opponents with 
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lessen the risk to defendants of turning over potentially incriminating 
information and significantly aiding the adversary.287 If plausible facts 
are included in the complaint, it is because the plaintiff already has 
evidence of the specific conduct alleged.288 Therefore, any responsive 
initial disclosures are unlikely to reveal to a plaintiff much that they 
did not already know.289 An obligation to disclose incriminating evi-
dence in this context would increase the likelihood of settlement and, 
thereby, avoid trial.290 
 Given that facts lending plausibility to a claim set some reason-
able boundaries by more tightly pinpointing the precise wrong al-
leged,291 parties have more guidance as to what documents to pro-
duce as initial disclosures.292 It is further more reasonable to expect 
that parties could actually produce more information initially given 
the plausible confines of the allegation.293 Actually disclosing infor-
mation that specifically substantiates plausibly pled facts is administra-
tively feasible; requiring disclosure of potentially massive amounts of 
information given the broad and amorphous contours of a notice 
pleading is not.294 
 Thus, the federal initial disclosure rule should follow suit and 
adopt an actual production requirement as recommended in the Fi-
nal Report and piloted in the Massachusetts Discovery Pilot.295 
 The Federal Rules should not, however, assume the Final Report 
and Massachusetts Discovery Pilot’s approach in conceiving of initial 
                                                                                                                      
more information than necessary). Documents exchanged as initial disclosures should 
speak precisely to the plausible facts alleged in the complaint. See id. A defendant’s initial 
disclosures should be provided, tit-for-tat, in response to the plaintiffs’ initial disclosures. 
See Final Report, supra note 17, at 8; Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 178. 
287 But see Amendments to Rules, supra note 201, at 511 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that initial disclosures result in parties turning over incriminating information to their 
adversaries). 
288 But see id. 
289 But see id. 
290 See Final Report, supra note 17, at 8. 
291 See id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57 (requiring that a pleading place the al-
leged wrongful conduct in “some setting” to lend plausibility to a claim). 
292 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 n.10; BLS Pilot Project, supra note 18, at 2; cf. Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 560 n.6 (finding that allegations of unspecified unlawful conduct, purportedly 
occurring between “legions” of unspecified management-level employees at an uncertain 
point over a seven-year span would lead to “sprawling, costly, and hugely time-consuming” 
discovery). 
293 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee’s note (1993) (tying breadth of ini-
tial disclosures to pleading specificity). 
294 See id.; Subrin, supra note 123, at 38–39 (arguing that vague pleadings will lead to 
overproduction). 
295 See BLS Pilot Project, supra note 18, at 2; Final Report, supra note 17, at 7–8. 
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disclosures as a principal document discovery tool.296 Although plausi-
ble pleadings provide increased opportunity for actual production of 
discoverable information as initial disclosures, pleadings may still range 
in degree of specificity.297 Some may fall toward the more specific end of 
the spectrum, tightly framing the alleged wrongful act.298 Other plead-
ings, however, might only barely cross the Twombly Court’s plausibility 
threshold.299 
 Thus, even plausible pleadings may not be sufficiently specific to 
support use of initial disclosure as a principal means of document dis-
covery.300 Litigants may still not have enough by way of guidance to sup-
port initial disclosure of requisite documents beyond those implicated 
specifically in the pleadings.301 They may not yet know all that they may 
use to support any claims, counter-claims, or defenses.302 It would be un-
realistic and unduly burdensome to expect parties to turn over informa-
tion as initial disclosures beyond that which substantiates facts plausibly 
alleged.303 
 Without sufficient foundation, it would be impracticable to impose 
a blanket national rule in the image of the Discovery Pilot Project, 
which imagines near-complete initial disclosure of all discoverable 
documents with only limited subsequent discovery.304 Because plausibil-
ity pleadings do not always provide that requisite foundation, the Mas-
sachusetts Discovery Pilot model is likely too ambitious in its entirety to 
warrant national replication.305 
                                                                                                                      
296 See BLS Pilot Project, supra note 18, at 3; Final Report, supra note 17, at 9. 
297 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570(“[W]e do not require heightened fact pleading of spe-
cifics, but only enough facts to state a claim . . . .”). 
298 See id. 
299 See id. (holding that the actual complaint filed in Twombly failed to “nudge” the plain-
tiffs’ claim across the threshold from insufficient conceivability to required plausibility). 
300 Cf. BLS Pilot Project, supra note 18, at 3. 
301 See Subrin, supra note 123, at 39–40. 
302 See id.; cf. BLS Pilot Project, supra note 18, at 2, 3 (recommending increased use of 
initial disclosures because potentially dispositive issues are established at the outset). 
303 See Wright & Miller, supra note 39, § 2053 (noting the particular burdens on 
large, corporate defendants of having to disclose massive amounts of information). 
304 See Subrin, supra note 123, at 39–40; cf. BLS Pilot Project, supra note 18, at 3. 
305 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (requiring plausible pleadings); BLS Pilot Project, supra 
note 18, at 2, 3; Subrin, supra note 123, at 39–40. Because the Massachusetts Discovery 
Pilot only ended in December 2010, it is still too early to know with certainty whether the 
program warrants wholesale national replication. BLS Pilot Project at 1. Discovery Pilot 
participants were asked to provide feedback on their experiences in the program. Id. at 3. 
The next step, then, will be to evaluate the Discovery Pilot in light of participant feedback 
and reflect on any perceived benefits and/or disadvantages. See id. 
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 But it is worth awaiting news on this effort in particular to deter-
mine whether even further reforms of the federal initial disclosure are 
justified.306 Not only did the Massachusetts Discovery Pilot test the ini-
tial disclosure reform recommendations advanced in the Final Report 
in practice, but it did so in a setting in which achieving greater efficien-
cies and cost savings is needed.307 Both the recent Federal Judicial Cen-
ter and RAND Institute studies indicate the particularly high costs of 
discovery in complex, commercial matters like those that appear before 
the BLS.308 Therefore, if successful, the Discovery Pilot model may in-
form federal discovery reform efforts.309 
Conclusion 
 Discovery in the American civil justice system is often prohibitively 
time-consuming and expensive. Therefore, discovery reform is war-
ranted. An area particularly ripe for reform is the federal initial disclo-
sure rule. The Joint Project advanced an alternative initial disclosure 
scheme which the Massachusetts Superior Court piloted in practice. 
Because of the relationship between specificity in pleadings and useful-
ness of initial disclosures, reform of the federal initial disclosure rule is 
particularly timely given the Supreme Court’s introduction of the plau-
sibility pleading standard in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. Although the 
Massachusetts Discovery Pilot program is likely too ambitious in con-
ceiving of initial disclosures as a principal document discovery tool to 
warrant wholesale national replication, the federal initial disclosure 
rule should be amended to include an actual production requirement. 
Emily C. Gainor 
 
306 See id. at 2, 3. 
307 See Administrative Directive, supra note 173; Lee & Willging, supra note 66, at 36; 
Major Companies, supra note 66, at 2–4. 
308 See Administrative Directive, supra note 173; Lee & Willging, supra note 66, at 36; 
Major Companies, supra note 66, at 2–4. 
309 See BLS Pilot Project, supra note 17, at 2, 3. 
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